Tribalism & Racism among the Ancient Greeks
A Weberian Perspective

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Abstract
Were the ancients Greeks “racists” in the modern sense of the term “racist”? The terms ancient Greek “proto-racism”, tribalism (and/or racism) are used here to denote the abstract, narcissistic notion that not only the non-Greek barbarians, but also certain ancient Greek tribes (like the Macedonians, the Boeoteans etc.) should be excluded from the Hellenic community, for they were considered to be inferior compared with the general Hellenic civilization. The present paper analyses comparatively the social phenomena of ancient Greek tribalism and modern racism in order to answer the following question: “what distinguishes the ancient Greek racism from the modern one?”. The basic philosophical and sociological question to be answered, running through the whole paper, is the following: “Could modern scientific, biological racism have evolved in ancient Greece?”. Scholars are right in rejecting such a possibility. However, we will see that, following ancient Greek racial thought, the interpretive model of modern racism could successfully be applied to ancient Greece. In other words, we make use of the Weberian “idealtypus” of modern racism. However, one has to cut it loose from the connotations of modern-day racism and analyse ancient Greek racism within the framework of the cultural, religious and political conditions of Antiquity. This is exactly the method that has been followed in the present study, in an effort to present in a critical spirit ancient Greek racial thought.

Introduction
"... I wish all of you now that the wars are coming to an end, to live happily in peace. All mortals from now on shall live like one people, united and peacefully working forwards a common prosperity. You should regard the whole world as your country - a country where the best govern-, with common laws and no racial distinctions. I do not separate people as many narrow minded others do, into Greeks and Barbarians. I’m not interested in the origin or race of citizens. I only distinguish them on the basis of their virtue. For me each good foreigner is a Greek and each bad Greek is a barbarian. If ever there appear differences among you, you must not resolve them by taking to arms; you should resolve them in peace. If need be, I shall act as your negotiator. You must not think of God as an authoritarian ruler, but you should consider him as common father, so that your conduct resembles the uniform behavior of brothers who belong to the same family. For my part I consider all -whether they be white or black-, equal, and I would like you to be not only the subjects of my common-wealth, but also participants and partners. Within my powers I shall endeavor to fulfill all my promises. You should regard the oath we have taken tonight as a symbol of love..."

THE “OATH” OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT
- SPEECH BY ALEXANDER THE GREAT
- AT OPIS (ASSYRIA), IN 324 BC, TO SOME 9,000 DIGNITARIES AND NOBLES OF ALL NATIONS
  [Pseudo-Kallisthenes* C; Eratosthenes]
The analysis and interpretation of the concept of ancient Greek racism presupposes that the concept at issue was formulated by the ancient Greeks in a specific social-historical context. Nevertheless, it is admitted by scholars that the ancient Greeks had not formulated the modern concepts of “race” and “racism”, which over the past 200 years writers from Britain, France, and Germany use to denote the following ideas:

“Physical differences between peoples have been observed throughout human history; all over the world people have developed words for delineating them. ‘Race’ is a concept rooted in a particular culture and a particular period of history which brings with it suggestions about how these differences are to be explained”


“Whatever the longer-term history of images of the ‘other’ in various societies and historical periods it does seem clear that only in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century does the term ‘race’ come to refer to supposedly discrete categories of people defined according to their physical characteristics”

Martin Bulmer & J. Solomos (ed), Racism, General Introduction, Oxford University Press, 1999 p. 8

“Before 1800 [race] was used generally as a rough synonym for ‘lineage’. But over the first half of the nineteenth century ‘race’ (and its equivalents in a number of other European languages) assumed an additional sense that seemed, initially, tighter and more scientific. This usage was evident, at its simplest, in the growing conviction that there were a finite number of basic human types, each embodying a package of fixed physical and mental traits whose permanence could only be eroded by mixture with other stocks”.

M. Biddiss, Images of Race, Leicester Univ., Press, 1979, 11

“In other words, in ancient Greek antiquity, bondage, racial discrimination and racial prejudice had nothing to do with physiognomy or skin color. It is true that various Greek writers insisted that slavery should be reserved for ‘barbarians’, but they considered Ethiopians no more barbarous than the fair Scythians of the north. Skin color and other somatic traits they attributed to the effects of climate and environment. The ancients put no premium on racial purity and were unconcerned with degrees of racial mixture. It is important to emphasize that the overall Greco-Roman view of blacks was highly positive. Initial, favorable impressions were not altered, in spite of later accounts of wild tribes in the far south and even after encounters with blacks had become more frequent. There was clear-cut respect among Mediterranean peoples for Ethiopians and their way of life. And, above all, the ancients did not stereotype all blacks as primitives defective in religion and culture” [1]. In this sense, we should be very careful not to categorize the ancient Greek as white racists. In
treatign racism which is so alive today, nothing is easier than to read back twentieth-century ideas into ancient Greek texts which in reality have quite another meaning. As Snowden put it:

“In the entire corpus of evidence relating to blacks in the Egyptian, Greco-Roman, and early Christian worlds, only a few concepts or notions (such as the classical somatic norm image and black-white symbolism) have been pointed to as so-called evidence of anti-black sentiment. These misinterpretations and similar misreadings of the ancient evidence, however, are examples of modern, not ancient, prejudices [...] And this is precisely what some modern scholars have done: misled by modern sentiments, they have seen color prejudice where none existed.

In summary, despite abundant textual and iconographic evidence to the contrary, Bernal and many Afrocentrists have used "black," "Egyptian," and "African" interchangeably as the equivalents of blacks/Negroes in modern usage. According to this misinterpretation, ancient Egyptians were blacks, and their civilization, an important part of the heritage of blacks of African descent, has been 'covered up' by white racists (sc who draw their arguments from the ancient Greeks).”


Therefore, we are not justified in projecting our modern racial prejudice to ancient Greek mentality. To avoid such an anachronism, we shall make use of the ideal-type construct of modern racism in our attempt to analyse the way in which the ancient Greeks discriminated against some specific “phyletic” (Greek and non-Greek) groups (“phylae”). This is actually the historical method of Max Weber according to whom “the language which the historian talks contains hundreds of words which are ambiguous constructs created to meet the uncosciously conceived need for adequate expression, and whose meaning is definitely felt, but not clearly thought out”[2]. The term or idea created at issue is “the ancient Greek racism” which does not necessarily reflect an essential property of the ancient Greek reality.

Despite the negative criticism the Weberian method of “ideal types” has received, it does feature a number of positive elements. According to this method, the empirical reality is not objective. “Real” is what we associate with values and meaning, which is always chosen by the individual. In this sense, the Weberian “Idealetypus” of ancient Greek racism is a schema constructed by the historian or the philosopher, which he then projects on (and compares with) the complex ancient Greek reality. However, one has to cut it loose from the connotations of modern-day racism and analyse the ancient Greek racism within the framework of the cultural, religious and political conditions of Antiquity. This is exactly the method that has been followed in the present study, in an effort to present in full and in a critical spirit ancient Greek racial thought. The ancient Greek “racism” as a type of discriminatory, differentialist behaviour, in the modern sense of the word, never existed. However, it could help researchers understand the ancient Greek racial prejudice, testing constantly the limitations of the “ideal type” of “ancient Greek racism”, by comparing it with the sources and the new discoveries of modern science. Modern science and society construct – in search of causality – “ideal types” in their attempts to comprehend the inner rationality of unprocessed historical evidence [3].

Such unprocessed historical evidence on the ancient Greek racism is provided by Aristotle who connects racism with slavery as follows:
“Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes (Greeks) do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative ... What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. It is often the case, however, that nature wishes but fails to achieve this result”.

Aristotle’s Politics 1255a-1255b (Barker, 1948: 17-21 and Ross, 1927: 293-295)

Aristotle provides us with a justification of the ancient Greek racism as a form of slavery. On his account, natural slaves are only the non-Greek barbarians who have to be a sort of mental and cultural defectives, lacking the capacity for being good and rational in the Greek way. That is to say, the ancient Greeks discriminated against the “barbarians” on the basis of cultural, not biological, traits, as, in Aristotle’s words, “nature wishes but fails to achieve this result” (op. cit and 1252b7-9) [4].

Mutatis mutandis there are at least two kinds of situation in which the ancient Greek cultural racism arises:

1. Frontier situations, in which a politically organized Greek group, with an advanced technology and education, encounters another such (Greek or non-Greek) group whose levels of technology and civilization are lower, e.g. the non-Greek Scythians or the Greek Macedonians. This is the 4th century B.C. historical context in which Aristotle says that

“where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors (sc barbarians) that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another’s, and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature”

Aristotle’s Politics 1254b (Barker, 1948: 61 and Ross, 1927:292)

Arising from this appear to be a number of particular problematic situations of metropolitan ancient Greek societies that are recurrently regarded as racial problems:

2. Situations in which a particular group of outsiders (“xenoi”) is called upon to perform a role, which, although essential to the social and economic life of the ancient Greek polis, is in conflict with its value system, or is thought to be beneath the dignity of the society’s own members. For example, Greek and non-Greek aliens (“xenoi”), slaves and freedmen of the ancient polis were the only ones occupied with banking and business in the modern sense of the word. From an economic point of view, the ancient Greek citizens (“politai”) were mainly rentiers. They were not merchants or entrepreneurs, who conducted business from their office. In Antiquity whoever did not limit oneself to utilisation of wealth
(vermögen) and budgetary management (Haushalt), but tried to gain profit out of his capital (acquisitive activity - Erwerb), was considered banausos, a man “not of the knightly kind”. According to Max Weber, the ancient Greeks set apart from citizenry the banausos, the (Greek or non Greek) person who pursued profit by peaceful means, as understood in modern terms [5].

The first kind of situation existed when the “barbarians” were at the gates of Rome. It may lead to the extermination of the external proletariat, to their slow subordination and incorporation into the more advanced society, or to a more complex process in which the external proletariat is, militarily speaking, victorious but, culturally speaking, absorbed, as Rome absorbed by the Greeks. Whatever the outcome, however, in both the situations the encounter between the groups is marked by tension and by emergence of stereotypes and beliefs systems that govern the interaction of members of one Greek group with those of another (Greek or non Greek) group. These may range from those based upon simple moral derogation as in the case of the non-Greek Illyrians’, the Greek Cretans’ and the Greek Boeoteans’ description of the metropolitan Greeks respectively as ‘drunks’, ‘liars’, and ‘stupid’ through Aristotle’s claim that “that the barbarian is less than a man, to modern (not ancient Greek) theories that different moral characteristics derive from differing genetic inheritance” [6].

Review of literature on ancient Greek racial thought

In his book The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (2004) Benjamin Isaac has produced a revisionist study on the topic of ancient Greek racism. Many classical scholars agree with Frank M. Snowden, who argued in two well-known books that the world of Greek and Roman antiquity was remarkably free of what we should call racial prejudice [7]. Isaac challenges such views, arguing that there are unmistakable instances throughout Greek and Roman literature of what he calls “proto-racism”. His aim is “to contribute to an understanding of the intellectual origins of racism and xenophobia”, and “to show that some essential elements of later racism have their roots in Greek and Roman thinking” [8].

Whether or not one agrees with Isaac's contention will largely depend on one’s conception and definition of racism. Isaac defines racism as follows: “an attitude towards individuals and groups of peoples which posits a direct and linear connection between physical and mental qualities. It therefore attributes to those individuals and groups of peoples collective traits, physical, mental, and moral, which are constant and unalterable by human will, because they are caused by hereditary factors or external influences, such as climate or geography” [9]. The crucial point for Isaac is the fact that racism does not allow for “the possibility of change at an individual or collective level in principle. In these other forms of prejudice (sc modern nationalism), the presumed group characteristics are not by definition held to be stable, unalterable, or imposed from the outside through physical factors: biology, climate, or geography” [10]. Nevertheless, he concedes that it is obvious that Greek and Roman forms of group prejudice based on unalterable physical factors are not the same as racism in the modern sense of the term [11].

The crucial link between modern racism and ancient Greek “proto-racism” in Isaac’s conception is the ancient preoccupation with environmental determinism. Here two key ideas emerge: that people can only become worse as a result of relocating to different climates and geographical locations; and that once environmental factors have determined degenerate characteristics, these characteristics cannot be undone, even when an entire people permanently relocates to an optimal climate. Judging by the chapter 14 in the Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters, Places concerning the heredity of acquired characteristics, Isaac maintains that the environmental-determinist approach was the predominant one among Greeks and Romans for explaining collective differences among peoples, and that the rigidity
of this approach in Greek and Roman “proto-racism” informed more recent and insidious forms of racism [12]. However, this environmentalist approach is weak, since, as Craige Champion points out:

“This is an assertion that is certainly open to challenge. A rival ancient explanation for collective characteristics stressed political and social institutions. Indeed, it can easily be argued that state organization is the single most important causal factor in ancient Greek theory on collective characteristics. Plato maintains that the 'politeia' is 'the nurse of men' ('Menex.' 238c). The idea that institutional structures determine collective characteristics is at the root of Plato's 'Republic' and 'Laws', and Aristotle's 'Politics'. In a famous passage Aristotle stresses the primacy of political association, stating that human beings are 'political creatures' ('Pol.' 1253a1-29), and even in the environmentalist tract 'Airs, Waters, Places' we find concession to the mitigating factor of governmental institutions (Chapter 16). In a famous passage on the educative function of flute-playing in ancient Arcadia (4.21), Polybius explicitly states that institutions overcame environment. There is ample evidence then to make the argument that, concerning the formation of collective group characteristics in ancient Greek thought, political and social institutions trump environmental factors.”

Craige Champion, Scholia Reviews, ns 14 (2005) 10

In other words, it is admitted by scholars that the primacy of cultural, political and social institutions in Greek thought for determining collective characteristics is the basic characteristic of the ancient Greek racial prejudices [13].

The ancient Greek cultural groups of genos, phyle, ethnos, phatria, and polis as the cultural cause of the ancient Greek racism

The ancient Greek cultural racism at issue perhaps is most evident in the discussions of Athenian notions of autochthony and Greek xenophobia. Isaac provides a useful discussion of the idea of autochthony and “pure lineage” at Athens, which of course found concrete expression in Pericles' citizenship law of 451/450 BCE. Along with this preconception, there is the related notion of the ancient Greek xenophobia and contamination by contact with foreigners. The Athenians attributed to themselves a pure lineage and made a claim of being autochthonous or of pure blood. That is why, they avoided contact with foreigners [14]. As shown, the ancient Greek racial approach was not biological, environmental, or determinist in the modern sense of the words. Ancient Greek’s racial prejudice was social, political and cultural. They could not overcome the social and racial limitations set by the ancient Greek cultural and political groups of genos, phyle, ethnos and phatria. In order to understand these cultural, not biological, racial limitations, it is helpful to get to know the general cultural structure of the ancient Greek polis. Max Weber in his attempt to analyse the ancient Greek break with ruler’s traditional legitimacy and the substitution of authority (Herrschaft) outlines the cultural structure of Greek antiquity as follows:

“At the beginning of known history we find the typical patrician city of Antiquity. It was always a coastal city. Up to the time of Alexander the Samnite wars in Italy [late fourth century B.C.] no “polis” was further removed from the sea than a day’s journey. Outside the area of the “polis” we find only villages (“komai”) with unstable political associations of “tribes” (“ethne”). A “polis” which was dissolved on its own initiative or by the enemy would be “dioikized” into villages. A real or fictitious act of “synoikismos”, on the other hand, was considered the origin of the city: the "settling together" of the sibs into or around a fortified caste on command of the king or by free agreement.[...]. For all that, the center of gravity of the nobility’s power
lay in the city. The political and economic masters of the countryside, the manor lords, financiers of trade and creditors of the peasantry, all were “astoi” — i.e., “town-dwelling” noble families, and the actual transplantation of the rural nobility into the cities continued apace. By the classical period the rural castles had been broken. The burial grounds (“nekropoleis”) of the noble clans had always been in the cities.

The truly fundamental element in the formation of a “polis”, however, was always thought to be the fraternization of the sibs into a cult community: the replacement of the “prytaneia” of individual families by a common “prytaneion” of the city in which the prytans took their communal meals. In Antiquity this formation of a “fraternity” did not only mean, as in the Middle Ages, that the coniuratio of the burghers, in becoming a commune, also adopts a saint for the city. The confraternity of Antiquity signified much more: the very foundation of a new local communal and cultic community, for there was no common church, as in the Middle Ages, of which everyone was already a member before the formation of the city fraternity. To be sure, Antiquity had always known interlocal cults in addition to those of local deities. But the form of religious activity most central for everyday life was the cult of the individual clan, which in the Middle Ages did not exist, and this was always firmly closed to outsiders and thus an impediment to fraternization. Such family cults were almost as severely restricted to the members as were the cults of India, and only the absence of magical taboo-barriers made the confraternization possible. Even then the principle remained that the spirits revered by the clan would accept sacrifices only from clan members; the same held for all other associations.

Among the associations which entered into a fraternal relationship in the cultic city-association we find, significant already at a very early stage and surviving into very late periods, the “phylae” and “phatries” in which everyone had to be a member to be considered a citizen [15]. About the “phatries” we can with certitude say that they reach back into a time antedating the “polis”. Later they were primarily cult associations, but also exercised some other functions; in Athens, for example, they passed judgment on the military capability of the young and the related capacity for inheritance. Hence they must originally have been military associations, corresponding to the “men’s house” which we have already discussed [IX:2 and elsewhere]; the very term was preserved in the Doric warrior states (“andreion”) and also in Rome (“curia” derives from “coviria”) as the designation for the subdivisions of the military association which had confraternized to form the “polis”. [...]. In the normal “phratries” of other cities, by contrast, the noble families or houses (“gene”, “oikoi”) alone supplied the ruling notables, as the inscriptions of the Demotionidai show for the old clan which had its castle in Deceleia.

In the urban constitution of later periods the “phatries” were treated as subdivisions of the “phylae” (and in Rome: of the three old personal “tribus”) into which the ordinary Hellenic city was divided. The term “phyle” (tribe) is technically associated with the “polis”; the word for a non-urban “tribe” is “ethnos”, not “phyle”. In the historical period the “phylae” had everywhere become artificial subdivisions of the “polis”, created for the purpose of assigning regular turns in the bearing of public burdens, in the sequence of balloting, and in the occupancy of offices, as well as for the organization of the army, and for the distribution of the yields of state enterprise, of booty and of conquered territories (thus in the the allocation of land [after the prehistoric Doric conquest] on Rhodes). At the same time, of course, they were also cult associations, as all — even the rationally formed — associations of early periods have always been. Artificial creations were also the typical three “phylae” of the Dorian, as indicated by the very name of the third: “Pamphylae” [i.e., “all tribes”], which finds a counterpart in the Roman tradition about the “tribus” of the Luceres. The origin of the “phylae” may frequently have been a compromise between a resident stratum of warriors and a newly entering conquering group.

Members of the “phylae” and “phratries”, “tribus” and “curiae” were, as “active” or “passive” citizens, all participants in the army of the “polis”, but only the members of the noble clans were “active” citizens—i.e., only they shared in the offices of the city. Hence the term denoting a “citizen” is at times directly identical with the word for a member

of the patrician "families". The attribution of a family to the nobility was here, as elsewhere, without doubt originally tied to the family charismatic dignity of the district chieftaincy; [...] Anyone not belonging to the urban, clan-associated, and militarily trained warriorship — and that means above all any free rural resident: "agroikos", "perioikos", "plebeius" — was economically at the mercy of the urban nobles. This was due to a number of factors: The exclusion from all political power, which also meant the exclusion from active participation in all judiciary activity at a time when the determination of law had not yet assumed a form strictly bound by firm rules;"


Classical Greek racial prejudices against the Greek Macedonians

As Max Weber pointed out (*op.cit.*), only the members of the “phylae” and “phratries” of the *polis* could be “active” or “passive” citizens, all participants in the army of the *polis*; only they could share in the offices of the city. Anyone not belonging to the urban, clan-associated, and militarily trained warriorship could be considered as a barbarian outsider irrespective of his Greek or non-Greek origin. In Greek Antiquity every *polis* had always interlocal cults in addition to those of local deities along with individual clans, which were always firmly closed to outsiders and thus an impediment to fraternization for every Greek or non-Greek outsider. This was actually the cultural (not biological) cause for the (metropolitan) ancient Greek racial discrimination against the Greeks Macedonians; that is, why the (metropolitan) Greeks considered their northern Greek neighbors, i.e., the Macedonians, not only different, but also inferior. In his biography of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) Peter Green attributes this cultural discrimination to the fact that the Macedonians made up a story about being descendants of Hercules, sliced a dog in two for the purposes of ritual, used a less prestigious Greek dialect, ran the country with "retrograde political institutions" (that is, the Macedonians were more like the Mycenean Kings or like the feudal Europeans with noblemen acting like feudal barons owing personal service to their king), their fighting style was ineffective (until Alexander the Great's father, Philip, learned from the Thracians among whom he was sent for education and as a youthful hostage), they were oath-breakers, they dressed in bear pelts, they regularly drank to excess, they were assassins, and they were incestuous. Aristotle and Alexander maintained a close relationship while student and teacher. Surprisingly, in later years, Aristotle's and Alexander's relationship deteriorated because of their opposing views on foreigners. Aristotle regarded foreigners as barbarians, while Alexander did not mind intermixing cultures. Perhaps Alexander did not mind mingling cultures due to the fact that, although being Greek, like the Sophists of his age, he did not adopt the ancient Greek cultural racism at issue. This was a touchy subject for Alexander. He felt uneasiness later at his father's second marriage when he killed a man for mentioning that Philip should have a "true" heir [17].

Let us see some more Macedonian “anti-racist” behaviours which differentiated them from the rest of the Greeks. Their difference was mainly cultural, not biological, since it is proven by Andronikos’ excavations in Greece in the last thirty years that the Macedonians were Greeks. Alexander the Great’s father, Philippos II, had several wives, all acquired for dynastic reasons. Alexander was Philip’s son by his third wife, Olympias, the daughter of the Molossian king, Neoptolemus of Epirus. His first two wives had produced no offspring; later, a fifth wife, Cleopatra, produced a son, Caranus, and a daughter, Eurydice. Olympias also had a daughter, Cleopatra. One of Philip’s mistresses, Philinna, had given birth to a half-brother of Alexander, Philip III Arrhidaeus, who suffered from a mental disability that would prevent him functioning independently as king. Alexander’s parentage involved a complex mixture of Greek and non-Greek elements. Macedonians were regarded as barbarians (that is, non-
Greeks) by the Greeks, although Macedonian’s Greekness is sure, since in the 5th century B.C. they have been permitted to compete at the Olympian Games, partly on the grounds that they were believed to be descended from the legendary Greek hero Heracles. Certainly they spoke Greek, though with a strong regional accent that turned “Philip” into “Bilip”. Olympias’ family would have been regarded as even more barbarian by the Greeks. Nevertheless, the Molossians had an ethnic genealogy embedded in Greek legend, and Olympias and Philip first met during the celebration of the Greek Mysteries of Samothrace. Still, Olympias was also a devotee of a snake-handling cult that would have seemed bizarre in classical Athens. For these cultural reasons, although the Macedonians prided themselves on their Greek culture, the metropolitan Greeks regarded them as semi-barbarians; a fact that substantiates the ancient Greek cultural racism at issue [18].

Classical Greek racial prejudices against Greek and non-Greek strangers

The Greeks of central Greece believed they were distinguished from Greek and non-Greek strangers (“xenoi”, “barbaroi”) on a cultural basis. On the one hand, the early use of the Greek word “barbarian (barbaros)” means “speaking another language”; on the other hand, it acquired other implications — inferiority, lack of political or moral order, failure to recognise the proper limit set for man with all its implications of the superior intelligence of the Greeks. “Barbaros” changed in meaning from someone who did not speak the Greek tongue to a foreigner whose mode of living and very nature were inferior and contrary to all that the Greeks stood for. One factor must be given due weight in considering the process of this change and that is the peculiar relationship which developed between the Greek colonies abroad (along with the Greek tribes far away from central Greece) and their mother countries in Greece. These sought to reproduce themselves in the image of their “metropoleis” — but as independent entities. The Greek language was the essential feature of the polis in Greece and the Greek colonies jealously sought to recreate the polis with its characteristic way of life abroad. Hence language, political institutions and social organisation and culture as interpreted by the Greek cities abroad or far away from central Greece (e.g. the Macedonian cities of the North), served to accentuate the difference between the characteristic Greek state and the foreigners outside. And it was not difficult to make the transition from difference to hostility, as the example of the racial prejudice against the Macedonians showed us (op. cit.) [19].

The antithesis between Greek and (Greek or non-Greek) barbarian stranger was present in the mind of the ordinary Greek. It must not be forgotten that the chief means whereby the Greek made contacts with the barbarians was slavery and war. For the most part the Greeks met the barbarians on war against other Greeks, e.g. the Macedonians, or against non-Greeks, eg., the Persians. This must have played a large part in determining the ordinary Greek’s idea of the barbarian and in encouraging his contempt for him as an inferior hostile being. Futhermore, the ordinary slaves the Greeks encountered in their daily lives were only different in language and culture (“logos”) and not in colour. Hence they could, and did, acquire this Greek culture by long residence in Greece. It was very difficult to distinguish the domestic slave at least from the ordinary Greek in clothes, language etc., at any rate in Athens, if the Old Oligarch’s complaints about the arrogance of slaves in Athens may be taken as a guide [20].

It would appear that the further outwards one proceeds from metropolitan Greece, the better the possibilities for friendly relations between the Greek colonies and the peoples among whom they settled became. An example may be taken from the situation in Cyrene in the fourth century B.C. where we learn from the Diagramma of Ptolemy I (S.E.G. IX, I) that children of a Greek father and a Libyan mother were to be regarded as citizens and included in the polis of Cyrene. We learn from Aristotle’s Politics (VI, 2 1319 b 2) that here the democratic members had departed from the strict orthodox Greek practice and had flooded the citizen body with these half-castes (nothoi pros metros) to secure their own ends. In the same
vein, the law introduced by Pericles in 451 B.C. restricting the citizenship to only people who had both Athenian mothers and fathers was more in accord with the normal Greek practice and, as we see in Cyrene, it was remoteness from the mother-country and the shortage of women in the colonies which led to intermarriage and hence a relaxation of Greek exclusiveness. These factors would also support the view that relations tended to be better the further one proceeded from the Greek mainland. It is true that contact between Greek and non-Greek on equal terms was more common on the fringes of the Greek world, where the Greeks in such areas felt themselves or their way of life threatened by the power of their barbarian neighbours. This practice explains the Macedonians’ intermarriages with non-Greek foreigners in Persia (op. cit.) [21].

The biological similarity between the Greeks and the Barbarians

There is a point in this connexion which we should clarify. It is admitted that racism can be articulated in terms of race or of culture, mind-sets, traditions, and religions. *Mutatis mutandis*, the ancient Greek cultural racism is like the “new cultural racism” which does not just biologize the cultural, it acculturates the biological. The new and ancient cultural, differentialist racism is predicated on the imperative of preserving the group’s identity, whose “purity” it sanctifies; it stigmatizes the mixing of cultures as the supreme mistake and supports a system of exclusion (separate development and rejection of the strangers) [22]. As we have seen, the ancient Greek cultural racism applies this system of exclusion to Greek and non-Greek strangers; a fact that shows us that the main emphasis in Greek thought about racial differences does not fall on the biological “purity”. That is, the ancient Greeks could not be scientific racists in the modern sense of the term. The development of Greek hostility towards the barbarians was due to cultural, not biological, differences between them. Herodotus and Homer present the barbarian peoples alongside the Greeks as part of the whole human world without stressing any biological dissimilarity [23]. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence that the ancient Greeks believed in the biological similarity between all human beings.

During the time of the rise and consolidation of the Greek *polis* (6th-4th c. B.C.) the main emphasis in Greek thought about racial differences falls not only on the differences between the Greek cities, but on all the variations of appearance, language and custom recorded by Hecataeus and Herodotus; and of course from the time of the Persian Wars we find that across the whole picture runs the deep dividing line between “Hellene” and “barbarian”. At the same period, we can trace some growth of the conception of the unity of all mankind, as a product of conscious rational thought. The human race was regarded as an aggregate of all individual men; a notion which is implied, no doubt, in the world maps of Anaximander and Hecataeus; the same assumption underlies the work of Herodotus. In this period down to the end of the fifth century it is easier to find indications of the conception of man as a specific being, a distinct type with certain typical characteristics that mark him off from gods on the one hand and from animals on the other. In a sense this idea of humanity existed from the earliest times: it is implied in the use of the Greek word “anthropos” (man) which is the etymological root of the modern word “anthropology”. Obviously, “man” is separated from other animal types by physical characteristics. In Homer men had been “speaking beings” (*aydeentes*). The importance of “logos” (speech) as the common, unifying attribute of all men is repeatedly apparent in later literature, e.g., in Protagoras’ myth with its distinction between man and non-speaking animals (*ta aloga*; Plato *Protagoras* 321 c) [24].

Such ideas led the Greeks by 400 B.C. towards a clear grasp of the concept of the unity of mankind. In the closing decades of the fifth century B.C., when the traditional
pattern of divisions between men was increasingly called in question, we find a good deal of
evidence for growing awareness in many quarters of the idea that all men, Greek and non-
Greek, are members of a single human race. It occurs here and there in the dramatists, e.g., in
a choral fragment from the Alexander of Euripides (Nauck Eur. 52), which develops denial of
the importance of high birth into a striking assertion of the single origin and nature of
mankind. The same view is voiced by the Sophists, notably of course by Antiphon in his
double attack on divisions within society and between Greek and non-Greek. His appeal is to a
universal physical characteristic: «we all breathe into the air through mouth and nostrils”
(87B 44). Thucydides has a place in the same picture, for his historical thinking is founded on
the assumption that there is such a thing as “human nature” everywhere the same. Most
important source of all, however, for this period is one with which both Antiphon and
Thucydides have much in common: the works of the medical writers, whose evidence proves
the assumption at issue. This is reflected in the Hippocratic Corpus under the title On Human
Nature (“Peri Physios anthropou”). Thus the writer of Prognostic, probably Hippocrates
himself, points out that “the same symptoms have the same meaning everywhere in Libya, in
Delos, and in Scythia” (25). Similarly the author of On Airs, Waters, Places, who includes
within his scope Asians and North Africans and peoples on the fringe of the known world,
believes in a single basic human nature (“physis”), which takes on varying characteristics
according to the environment in which it is placed [25].

Nevertheless, this anti-racist ancient Greek approach is by no means so highly
developed or so generally accepted as is sometimes supposed. The ancient Greek racial
prejudices aforementioned were always enforcing the ancient Greek cultural racism at
issue. Baldry describes this racism as follows:

“The unity of mankind cannot be said to occupy more than a very minor place in
Greek thought in the fourth century or even in the third. It may be, of course, that
the evidence for the time of the Peloponnesian War is deceptive: much of it comes
from the medical writers and those close to them, and their views may be untypical,
giving us an exaggerated impression of the spread of such ideas in their time. One
can all too easily overestimate the importance of beliefs expressed by a small
intellectual minority, while forgetting that the majority found it difficult to see
beyond the horizon of the polis; or to overcome the limitations that slavery and
other facts of their life imposed upon their sight. But I think it can also be said that
in the fourth and third centuries the minds of those capable of a wider vision were
dominated by two strains of thought which overshadowed the concept of mankind
as a whole. One of these was Pan-Hellenism, now more consciously realised, more
positive, and in some minds more aggressive than before. In a sense this was a
tendency towards a wider unity, but it also deepened the dividing line between
Greek and “barbarian”; and the shift of view which now saw the antithesis as one
between cultures rather than between races, bringing some foreigners by birth on
to the Greek side of the fence, did little as yet to weaken the division itself. The
outstanding spokesman of this outlook in the fourth century is of course Isocrates,
and to show that he is no isolated exception there is the fifth book of the
“Republic” and the “Menexenus”. After Alexander far be it from me to attempt to
sum up in a single sentence the relationship between Greeks and the rest; but I take
it to be largely true that the old antithesis persisted in a new form, setting those
who shared the Hellenic language, education and mode of life apart from those who
did not. The unity of the Hellenistic world was to a large extent a projection
outwards of the unity of Greece, not a unification of mankind. […]

What are the implications of all this for the Greek view of foreign peoples? By the beginning of the third century B.C. two trends of thought, neither completely new, had come to the fore to modify the attitude of some Greeks, at any rate, towards
the old conception of the division between Greek and foreigner: first, acceptance of a
type of culture and civilisation, use of the Greek language and acknowledgment of
Greek standards, rather than race, as the criterion marking off "Hellene" from "barbarian"; second, the belief that true wisdom and moral worth can raise their possessors above such barriers, which have importance only for the conflict-ridden majority of mankind. Among those who held this belief obviously went far towards undermining the idea of a divided world, Greek contrasted with non-Greek. We have not yet reached the picture, however, of a world-society in which not only those who enjoy Hellenic culture, not only the wise, but all peoples, or at any rate all civilised peoples, have a place.”.


My own view is that a substantial anti-racist criticism of the antithesis between Greek and barbarian, together with the claim that the true division lay between good and bad, went back to various earlier thinkers; in this case, perhaps especially to the Stoic Aristo, who was one of Eratosthenes’ teachers at Athens (4th-3rd c. B.C.). But the one who really prevented the cultural cleavage between Greek and non-Greek peoples was Alexander the Great. Obviously there was food for deep thought for the Greek mind in the thoroughly “un-Greek” attitude which Alexander the Great adopted towards “barbarians” who had other gods and spoke other tongues, treating at least one “barbarian” nation as equal to his own, and through inter-marriage and other means involving Greeks in a mixing of peoples which cut across the prejudices that most Greeks had accepted for so long. The geographer Eratosthenes in his Geographica criticised the division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, and also the advice given to Alexander (as Plutarch tells us in De Alex. I 6, by Aristotle) to treat Greeks as friends and barbarians as enemies. He said it was better to make a division according to good qualities and bad, “for many of the Greeks are bad, and many of the barbarians civilised” (I iv, 9). The division Eratosthenes put forward in place of Greek and barbarian was something like «civilised» and «uncivilised», with good government, practised in many parts of the earth, as the criterion of merit. Looking, at Alexander’s world with the geographer’s eye, Eratosthenes argues that there are other civilised peoples besides those who can be labelled Greek. Here for the first time, we have the concept of a multi-racial and multi-lingual civilised humanity, put forward by a Greek whose picture of mankind included non-Greek centres of civilisation comparable with his own, to all of which the same standard must apply [26].

Summation

To recapitulate, scholars agree that the majority of the ancient Greeks found it difficult to see beyond the horizon of the city-state or to overcome the limitations that slavery and other facts of their life imposed upon their sight. That is to say, the ancient Greeks did not reach the picture of a world-society in which not only those who enjoy Hellenic culture, not only the wise, but all peoples, or at any rate all civilized peoples, have a place. These research findings explain the ancient Greek cultural racism at issue; they also give us the reason why many ancient Greeks called the ancient Greek Macedonians uncivilized barbarians [27]. According to Thucydides, Andriotis, Chatzidakis and Wilkes, in the eyes of many ancient Greeks, many Greeks, e.g., the Macedonians, the Epirotes, as well as the Boeotians and the Thessalians were barbarian, uncivilized Greek tribes. Thus, Andriotis also argues that the designation “barbarian” was attributed by ancient writers to other uncivilized Greek tribes, as well, such as the Epirote tribe of Chaones (Thuc. 2.80). Chatzidakis agrees on this asserting that as was the case with Macedonians, some included Macedonia and Epirus in Greece, while others did not. Thucydides speaks of the barbarian Chaones in B.80, while in 81 it is mentioned that the Thesprotians and the Molossi were also barbarians, according to Thucydides. Chatzidakis affirms that the term barbarian Macedonian is not used in an ethnological sense, but with a derogatory cultural meaning. Admitting that, for some ancient Greeks, the Macedonians were an uncivilized Greek tribe, Chatzidakis says that for that reason many excluded certain tribes.
from the national community, for they were considered to be inferior compared with the general national Greek civilization. As shown, the reason for this ancient Greek prejudice against the Macedonians was the ancient Greek cultural racism.[28].

NOTES


[5] See Max Weber, “The Origin of Modern Capitalism” in Max Weber, General Economic History, trans. Frank H. Knight, New Brunswick NJ, Transaction, 1981, 1995 print, p. 331 and Max Weber, Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, pp. 1356-1358. Aristotle equates this acquisitive economic activity to “apolaustikon ichrematistin vion”, a life dedicated to the pursuit of money and pleasure by means of material goods. Weber’s view on the ancient Greek (patrician) ideal regarding possessive economic activity, according to which neither profit nor wealth is an end in itself, is confirmed by Aristotle as follows: “Most people prefer pleasure. For that reason they lead a life of pleasure [...] they appear to be slaves to this kind of life [...] like Sardanapalus [...] money-oriented life is not of the knightly kind, and it is clear that wealth is not the ultimate goal. It is just a means to achieve something else” (Nicomachean Ethics l. iv. 1095b15-22, 1096a5-8. Cf. Eudemean Ethics 1215a32-b5). There are many passages in ancient texts testifying the aversion of the ancient Greek to profit and wealth accumulation. A characteristic passage comes from Sophocles’ Antigone (verses 278-331), where Kreon presents wealth (argyron) as an evil for humankind (“anthroposin kakon”). On ancient Greek anti-capitalism see also Michael Bakakoukas, Ancient Greek Anti-Capitalism. A Weberian Perspective, Xlibris, Usa, 2005.


[10] Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism, op. cit., 27
[11] Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism, op. cit., p. 1: “I certainly do not claim that we are dealing here with the specific form of scientific racism which was the product of the nineteenth century”.


“Ancient Greek Cultural Proto-Racism”, *ERCES Quarterly Review*, Vol. 2 No 1: March/April 2005) [forthcoming]. In these papers, I explained the reason why the ancient Macedonians were called by many ancient Greeks barbarians. A nationalistic reply to my articles was published in *Historia Illustrated* (Athens, Greece: 389, 2000, pp.126-127) in which it is argued that by calling the ancient Macedonians barbarians we provoke FYROM Slav Macedonians to claim the Greek Macedonia. Also a left wing political reply to my articles was published by the daily communist Greek newspaper *Kyriakatiki Avgi* (Eleni Perdikouri, “Arvanites and Albanians”, Athens, Greece, 31 Dec. 2000).

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