Issue E022 of 15 June 2002


The Military Orientation of the Roman Emperors
Septimius Severus to Gallienus
(146-268 C.E.)


by
Constantina Katsari
B.A. (Arch. & ArtHist.), M.Phil., Ph.D. (Hist.)

The end of the Antonine period marked also the end of the long-lasting peace that existed in the Roman Empire ever since the Flavian era. The brief intervals of a few expansive or defensive wars did not change the general political stability until Septimius Severus came into power after a series of battles against the usurpers of the throne. Even though he eventually won and became the indisputable ruler of the empire, military activities were not curtailed; instead they increased substantially in number. In fact, the reduced political power of subsequent emperors forced them to pay special emphasis to the needs or the demands of the army. Apparently that was the only course of action that would allow them to keep the throne, defeat the numerous usurpers and restrain the defiant barbaric tribes that continuously demanded excessive subsidies. Sheer necessity was the reason for the military orientation of the Severan and Post-Severan emperors at all levels, both economic and political.

After the violent death of Commodus in 192 AD and the subsequent brief reign of Pertinax, civil war broke out between Didius Julianus, Pescennius Niger, Clodius Albinus and Septimius Severus. One of the ancient historian who described the events of that period, Herodian, emphasizes on the fact that after the reign of Commodus money became the most attractive inducement for men (Herodian 5.8.3), and it was used by the emperors in order to bribe the soldiers and win over their allegiance(Herodian 1.9.1; 1.9.4). The political upheaval, the civil wars and the general distrust towards the central authorities undermined the constancy of the soldiers' allegiance. The emperors had to spent large sums of money for the maintenance of the loyalty of the army, which became the most important factor in the political arena. According to Herodian, when Didius Julianus made his bid for the throne, this was the first time that the soldier's characters begun to be corrupted. They learned to have an evil and insatiable lust for money and to ignore the feeling of respect for their emperors... (Herodian 2.6.14).

Coin of Septimius SeverusAt the end of the second century AD Septimius Severus became the founder of a new dynasty that ruled the Roman Empire for the first quarter of the third century. The series of civil wars and military strife that preceded his rise to the throne continued also later and set the political characteristics for the whole of the third century. In fact, he should be considered the first of a line of Military emperors that was more interested in waging wars than improving the living standards of his people. Septimius Severus reigned for the next 18 years fighting against the Parthians (Dio 75.1 and 9-12; ILS 417; HA 12) and the British (Dio 75.5, 76.13; Herodian 3.14; ILS 431, 436). The continuous military expeditions combined with other disproportionate public expenses, such as lavish largesse and elaborate buildings, were damaging to the fiscal economy of the Empire. The emperor aimed at keeping the unreserved devotion of the army, even after he defeated his opponents. The only way to achieve such loyalty was not through discipline but through the use of money; so, he increased the number of his troops and he increased the soldiers' pay, a rise that is not quantified by the sources (Herodian 3.8.4.; SHA 12.2; Alston 1994, pp. 113-123). At the same time, he introduced the annona militaris, a tax that covered individual expenses for food, clothing, fodder and military equipment. Septimius Severus, at the end of the second century AD, favoured the practice of the annona, as the indicative way to institute a pay rise and provide a steady increase to the soldier's income (Develin 1971, pp. 685-695). Since both the stipendium and the donativa were simultaneously increased, the soldiers had more coins to spend in retail trade than ever before. The introduction of the annona did not cause a shift towards a natural economy, as has been suggested (Van Berchem 1977, pp. 332-333). J.P. Callu cites a document of AD 247 according to which Aurelius Didymus paid six drachmas as his share of the annona. He assumes that while grain requisitions were usually exacted in kind, requisitions in wine and other goods were exacted in coin (Callu 1969, pp. 291-293). In this case we may suspect that the annona did not undermine the monetarization of the Roman world, since it was just another tax paid to the government either in coin or in goods according to the capacity of the taxpayer. Ancient historians and probably other members of the elite disagreed strongly with Septimius Severus' behaviour that undermined military discipline by teaching the men to be greedy for riches and seducing them into a life of luxury (Herodian 3.8.4-5). Other privileges granted to the military, such as legal recognition of their marriages, assignment of allotments of land, and facilities in order to engage in commercial enterprises, increased the financial capacity of the soldiers and turned them into an important economic force within and beyond the frontiers.

Septimius Severus' son, the notorious Caracalla (211-217 AD), not only sustained the military basis of the empire but he also tried to expand it. It seems that followed the policy of his predecessor closely, probably because he believed strongly that the Roman army was the real basis of the political power behind the throne. In view of his impending battles against the Germans (Dio 77.13; ILS 451), the Parthians (Dio 77.12, 78.1-3; Herodian 4.10) and the Armenians (Dio 77.21), he raised once more the payment of the soldiers by fifty percent and he bribed them with donativa (Herodian 4.4.7; Dio 78.36.3-4), so that he could maintain the unconditional support of the military machine. Since his short life was a continuous campaign, he spent an enormous amount of money on food supplies, military equipment and other relevant expenses, while he paid subsidies to the Alamanni (Dio 77.14). Although certain expenditures towards the pacification of the areas near the limes were deemed necessary, the majority of the population condemned other types of expenses, such as the extravagant number of coins used to cover up the vicious murder of Caracalla's brother (Dio 78.12.4; Herodian 4.4). The excessive sums of money spent at that time resulted in a serious change in the mentality of the soldiers. They became so exhausted in body and so dejected in mind that they no longer cared at all about the largesses (Dio 90.3.4-5), asking constantly for more in every occasion. In fact, when they accepted donatives they thought that the emperor was paying off a debt rather than distributing a largess (Herodian 2.11.7-8). In addition to army salaries, he also distributed general discharge-bonuses, praemia, after the soldiers completed 25 years of service or more. The amount of the praemia was fixed at 12,000 sestertii per person (Dio 55.23) and the State spent more than 1,188 million sestertii a year throughout the reign of Caracalla (Duncan-Jones 1994, 34-37). The veterans probably used this money in order to buy land or estates that would allow them to live in prosperity for the rest of their lives. Caracalla obviously considered the army an economic priority that would allow him to remain in power for as long as possible. In fact he was quite explicit about his plans, since in 212 he used to say: nobody in the world should have money but me; and I want it to bestow upon the soldiers. Once when Julia chided him for spending vast sums upon them and said, 'There is no longer any source of revenue, either just or unjust, left to us' he replied, exhibiting his sword, 'Be of good cheer mother: for as long as I have this, we shall not run short of money' (Dio 78.10.4).

A Coin of Emperor Macrinus

After his death, Macrinus (217 AD), a man who was not a member of the Severan dynasty and did not belong to the senate became the next emperor (Dio 78.11 and 14; Herodian 5.1). Although he succeeded Caracalla successfully, his life was not long enough to allow him sufficient time for radical changes. Already in the beginning of his reign he attempted to fix the pay of those serving in the Praetorian Guard at the amount established previously by Severus, thus reducing their salaries. This effort, although praised by some, ended up in disaster (Dio 90.12.7), because the soldiers were angered by the reduction of their pay and by the withdrawal of the prizes and exemption from military duties which they had gained from Caracalla (Dio 90.28.1-2). Macrinus was forced to admit that it was impossible, on the one hand, to give the troops their full pay in addition to the donatives that they were receiving and impossible, on the other hand, not to give it... (Dio 90.36.2-3). The lack of military discipline resulting from the deduction of military payments eventually led to the revolt of the troops and the submission of the State to the Army. From that moment onwards, the success of each emperor to remain on the throne relied entirely upon the will of the soldiers.

A Coin of ElegabalusMacrinus was soon killed and subsequently replaced by Elagabalus, a descendant of the Severan dynasty (218-222 AD). Although he was well known for his religious, sexual and other eccentricities, there is only scanty information on his political or economic activities (Butler 1910). Probably his brief reign could not be characterised by any major changes, while his administration should have followed the lines of the administration of Caracalla. It is also interesting to note that despite unlimited spending, there were no new taxes. When he was murdered, Severus Alexander (222-235), the last of the Severan dynasty, replaced him on the throne. Alexander faced the attacks of the Parthians (Herodian 6.3-6; SHA, Sev. Alex. 55-56) and the Germans (Herodian 6.8.9; SHA, Sev. Alex. 59), an explosive situation that urged him to follow his predecessors' political orientation by leading military expeditions and by benefiting economically his army or by paying subsidies. Moreover, the supposition that the praetorian prefects were given senatorial rank (SHA, Sev. Alex. 21) allows us to assume that the political power of the army increased substantially. Severus Alexander handed out also aurei in numbers that exceeded donatives of the second century (Harl 1996, pp. 222-223), a gesture that indicates a) the need to maintain a loyal army during this restless period by bribing the men with as many gifts as possible and b) the importance of gold and silver bullion in contrast to the debased billon coinage that constituted the stipendium. Alexander's reign lasted 13 years under the influence of his mother, Julia Mamaea, and the Senate (SHA, Sev. Alex. ). During this period the State regulated imperial expenditure in a way that would help the recovery from previous extravagances, although the poor outcome probably did not justify the original expectations.

The military orientation of the Severan emperors caused an increase in the demand of coined metal, especially silver. Coin hoards and excavation finds from the provinces indicate that the State increased substantially the annual mint output of denarii and antoniniani in order to cover its expenses (Katsari 2001, ch. 3). However, it seems that the amount of silver and gold bullion in the empire did not increase. In fact, wars were not as profitable as they used to be during the first and the beginning of the second century, since the emperors did not seek to expand the line of the frontiers; instead they waged only defensive wars against the barbaric tribes or civil wars in order to secure their throne. These activities resulted to the drainage of the imperial treasury, since fresh bullion or loot would not be imported in the empire. So, in their struggle to find more coins in order to pay the expenses for their military campaigns, Roman emperors kept melting down and re-coining the older silver coins of higher fineness into new debased ones. In some cases, older coinages probably disappeared completely from the circulation pool. This practice was intensified during the reign of Septimius Severus and continued uninhibited until the death of Alexander Severus, although short-lived attempts to restore the denarius at its previous level did occur (Walker 1978, pp. 49-50; Sperber 1974, pp. 38-46; Carson 1990, pp. 232 ff.; Bland 1996, pp. 63-100).

The Post-Severan emperors are also widely known as Military emperors, mainly because they did not belong to a specific dynasty. Most of them derived their political power from the army that also gave them the unique opportunity to set their eyes on the throne. Although the scanty information about these emperors do not allow us to reconstruct in detail their policies concerning the army and state expenses, they seem to have followed the same pro-military political and financial ideas of their predecessors for two reasons. First of all, they needed to keep the troops content, since they relied on the army for the continuation of their rule, and secondly, they had neither the time nor the power to promote any innovations. In AD 235, Maximinus was the first emperor of 'humble' origin to rise completely from the ranks (Herodian 7.1). In order to establish a firm rule he doubled the pay of the troops as part of his bid for the throne (Herodian 7.8.8). Later he conducted wars on the Danube (Herodian 7.2; SHA, Max. 13; ILS 488-490) and he faced the various usurpers that tried to undermine his supremacy (Herodian 7.1.), a situation that forced him into a ruthless search for money. He managed to kill the Gordians who were proclaimed emperors (Herodian 7.9) but subsequently, since he proved to be unable to establish his rule, his soldiers murdered him (Herodian 8.5; SHA, Max. 23). The Senate that did not approve of an emperor of low origin appointed in 238 AD Balbinus and Pupienus as co-emperors (Herodian 7.10; SHA, Gord. 8) but they were also killed by their soldiers. Finally, Gordian III, a young boy descending from the above Gordians, was proclaimed emperor during the same year (Herodian 8.8).

The majority of the army accepted the rule of the young boy and followed him against the invasions of the Goths, the Carpi (Peter Pat. Frag. 8; SHA, Gord. 26,34; IGR 1.723-4) and the Persians (SHA, Gord. 13; Zosimus 1.18) as well as the rebellion of Sabinianus in Africa (SHA, Gord. 23; Zosimus 1.17). Gordian III tried to improve the increasingly deteriorating situation by suppressing informers (CJ 10.11.2-3) and preventing local officials from the exploitation of the population (IGR 1.764; CJ 4.2.3). However, it seems that none of the above actions remedied the situation, according to an inscription (CIL, iii, 12336; Cagnat, IGRR, i, 674; Abbot 1926, no. 139) from Scaptopara in Thrace (238 AD), which shows that the inhabitants of the region were still oppressed by soldiers and others. Although citizens were allowed to complain, it is not certain if the bureaucratic machine would undermine their petition or if the problems would be solved. I think that the failure of his efforts should be attributed to the deteriorating political and military situation that was impossible to resolve at the time.

Gordian was murdered in AD 244 and was immediately replaced by Philip the Arab, another political figure who rose from the ranks (York 1972, 320-332). Henceforth the Senate would not and could not interfere in the process of proclaiming a new emperor, while the army became the sole regulator of imperial politics. The initial act of Philip's reign was the conclusion of an agreement with the Persians (Zosimus 1.19), whilst he could not avoid the attack of the Carpi and the Germans from the north (Zosimus 1.20; IGR 4.635) and eventually the invasions of the Goths and the Vandals (Zosimus 1.20; Jordanes, Gothic History 89-92). The celebration of the thousandth birthday of Rome with lavish games and handouts to the populace (SHA, Gord. 33) created further economic problems. The financial situation worsened even more when various usurpers, such as Silbanacus, Pacatianus and Iotapianus, attempted in vain to take Philip's place on the throne. The death of Philip and his son that followed shortly afterwards left the empire once more in turmoil.

Only Trajan Decius managed to outlive his opponents and became an emperor in AD 249 (Zosimus 1.21-22). Although he is mainly known for his empire wide persecution of the Christians (Eusebius, HE 6.39ff) we should not forget that during his reign he also had to put down a civil war in Gaul (Eutropius 9.4) and to fight against the Goths (Jordanes 101-102; Zosimus 1.23), who invaded the Balkans. During his reign Lucius Julius Aurelius Sulpicius Uranius Antoninus proclaimed himself emperor at Emesa in Syria. Later, Marcus Aemilius Aemilianus successfully conducted an expedition against the Goths and consequently also was acclaimed emperor and received recognition in a few cities of Asia Minor. Trajan Decius finally died violently while he was conducting his wars against the barbarians in the Balkans; so the soldiers proclaimed Trebonianus Gallus emperor, who now had to face a series of invasions. At that time the Persians overran Mesopotamia to Antioch and took Armenia (Zosimus 1.26-27; Zonaras 12.21), while the Goths crossed the Danube to plunder. Gallus made a treaty with the Goths allowing them to keep Roman prisoners and granting them tribute (Zosimus 1.24). Aemilius Aemilianus in 253 AD won a victory over the Goths and was acclaimed emperor; his reign, though, only lasted a few months (Zosimus 1.28-29).

A Coin of GallienusAemilian was still alive when Valerian and his son Gallienus fought their way to the throne and kept it for almost 15 years. This was the longest reign since the time of Septimius Severus and, although, it was not enough to solve the problems that had accumulated for the past half century, it still brought some stability to the empire and prevented it from collapsing. During this period plague (SHA, Gal. 5) and civil strife raged within the provinces of the empire; Ingenuus in Pannonia (ILS 539; SHA 30), Postumus in Gaul, Spain and Britain (Zosimus 1.38; ILS 560f; CIL 2. 4943, 4919, 7.820), Regalianus on the Danube (SHA, Thirty 10; Eutropius 9.8), Macrianus and Quietus in the East (Zonaras 12.24; Pap.Oxyr. 1476), Mussius Aemilianus in Egypt (SHA 4). At the same time, various enemies attacked the empire from the north and the east; Germans (ILS 538), Goths (Zosimus 1.31-35), Persians capture Dura, Franks (Aurelius Victor 33.3), Marcomanni (Epitome 33.1), Alamanni (Zosimus 1.37; Zonaras 12.24), Persians (Ammianus 23.5.3; Zonaras 12.23; Zosimus 1.39), Goths (Aurelius Victor 33.3; Eutropius9.8; Jordanes 107-109; SHA 6-7, 11-12, Dexippos, frag.28). Even the emperor Valerian himself was captured by the Persians and died in captivity; a defeat that probably was the ultimate moral blow against the Romans (Zosimus 1.36; Zonaras 12.23). The military and political crises of the reign were matched by a monetary and probably even economic situation that steadily approached complete catastrophe.

The extent of the damage becomes evident especially in the provinces of Asia Minor and Syria that had to face a series of political and military disasters in the mid-third century. Of major importance was the external threat of the Goths and the Sassanians; in the 250s and 260s for the first time the way lay open for the Gothic invasions. The barbarians were directed against the East end of the Black Sea: they pillaged Pityus and Trapezous (Zosimus 1.31-3), they attacked central and western Asia Minor, while they fell upon Bithynia and sacked most of its cities (Zosimus 1.34-6; Amm. Marc. 31.5.16). A few years later, after attacking Chalkedon, they sailed onward through the Hellespont and ravaged the coast of the Aegean, where they plundered some of the cities of Ionia. Either at this time or soon afterwards, presumably by way of Pontus, they seem to have raided also Cappadocia and northern Galatia (Syncellus 1.700). During the same period an equal danger emerged in the south and east. Shapur I, the Sassanid king, dealt three devastating military blows to Rome between 240 and 260 AD. Every attempt on the part of the Romans to prevent the invasions proved to be hopeless. The Persians not only managed to attack and probably sack the city of Antioch for a brief span of time but they also led raids in Cilicia Pedias, the coast of Rugged Cilicia, Cappadocia, Pontus and Lycaonia after the death of the captive emperor, Valerian (Mitchell 1993, p. 237). Undoubtedly this situation affected the economy of the area and probably reduced the standard of living of the population.

Brigandage was another nemesis for the inhabitants of certain provinces (Mitchell 1995, pp. 211-3; Hopwood, 1983, pp. 173-187). Mountainous regions that were not completely Romanized or even Hellenized were under the control of brigands that ravaged the surrounding areas. For example, the province of Pisidia had to be entrusted to a governor of higher rank because the small cites were reluctant to pay taxes, and the inhabitants of the villages often turned to brigandage (Justinian Nov. 24). The political instability of the third century facilitated the expansion of this phenomenon, so that the Roman State was forced to treat brigands not as mere criminals but as public enemies, suppressed by the army and not by the local police (Mitchell 1993, p.234). As for the army, it was not always a force for peace and prosperity, since pillage and extortion by soldiers is repeatedly attested in our sources. The Roman Empire was reverting to a condition of anarchy that had not been known since the first century BC.

The repeated wars, brigandage and all kinds of internal conflicts caused the urgent need for more revenues that would be distributed in the form of coins. Since the short-lived emperors did not have the essential time to take innovative decisions or impose long-term programmes, they reverted to the old practice of the manipulation of coinage. Post-Severan emperors and usurpers tried to take advantage of the difference between their debased coinages in relation to the Severan silver coins. They withdrew older of higher fineness silver coins and they re-issued them at a more debased form. In fact, by the end of the reign of Gallienus fineness had fallen to about 2,5 % (Carson 1990, p. 234), although the exchange rates between silver and gold did not change at the same speed. It is possible that the slight raising of the fineness standards towards the end of Gallienus reign foreshadowed further intentions of improvement. However, this improvement was meaningless and Claudius took the imperial antoninianus to its absolute nadir in intrinsic worth (Cope 1969, p. 161). The monetary system was stabilized only later, after the reign of Diocletian, when the Roman emperors regained their former political and economic power.

The military orientation of the Roman emperors affected both their political approaches and their financial policy during the third century AD. The fact that they could not avoid the battles against both external enemies and usurpers that endangered the unity of the empire was obvious to everybody. This situation allowed the army to interfere actively until it eventually became the most important factor in the political scene. At the same time, the production of mainstream coinage was increased substantially in order to cover the emperor's private expenses and his military campaigns. The reasons for such an increase was mainly the demand of the army for increased payments every time a usurper appeared on the horizon. Contemporary writers, mainly Dio Cassius and Herodian, noted the dangers arising from the excessive payments of the soldiers and advised against it. However, the emperors did not change their policy and the manipulation of gold and silver coinage became a standard procedure. It is surprising that under such strenuous conditions the Roman Empire did not collapse already during the middle of the third century. Instead it underwent a radical transformation at all levels, political, economic and ideological and survived for another 1000 years.



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ammianus Marcellinus, History

CIL=Corpus Incriptionum Latinarum

CJ=Corpus Judaicarum

Dio Cassius, Roman History

Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History

Eutropius, History

HA = Historia Augusta

Herodian of Syria, History

IGR or IGRR = Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes

ILS = Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae

Jordanes, Gothic History

Oxyr. Pap.=The Oxyrhynchus Papyri

SHA = Scriptores Historiae Augustae

Zonaras, History

Zosimus, History

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Duncan-Jones, R., Money and Government in the Roman Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Harl, K., Coinage in the Roman Economy, 300 BC to AD 700, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press 1996.

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Katsari, C., The Monetary Economy of the Eastern Mediterranean, from Trajan to Gallienus, Ph.D. Thesis, University College London 2001.

Mitchell, S., Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods, I, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993.
Mitchell, S., Cremna in Pisidia: An Ancient City in Peace and in War, London: Duckworth 1995

Sperber, D., Roman Palestine, AD 200-400. Money and Prices, Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press 1974.

Van Berchem, D., 'L' annone militaire est-elle un mythe?', in A. Chastagnol, C. Nicolet and H. van Effenterre (eds.), Armees et fiscalite dans le Monde Antique, Colloque National du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, au Centre Universitaite Tolbiac de Paris I, 14-16 Octobre 1976, Paris: Edition du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 1977, pp. 331-334.

Walker, D.R., The Metrology of the Roman Silver Coinage, Pertinax to Uranius Antoninus, III, BAR Suppl. Ser. 40, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978.

York, J., 'The Image of Philip the Arab', Historia 21 (1972), pp. 320-332.



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