The role of Britain in Greek politics has been well documented in a number of studies and perspectives. However, very little has been written about the military role of Britain in Greek affairs either from the Greek or British point of view. Studies on postwar British counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns, such as the case of Palestine or Malaya, demonstrate that Whitehall was particularly interested in this type of operations that combined political, intelligence and military activities. Although a number of studies dial with British postwar COIN role, the case of Greece still remains underestimated. The aim of this article is both to outline British Army’s counter-guerrilla influence in Greece during the challenge of the civil war years and its contribution to the nature of the Greek National Army. This study is based on the assumption that Britain played an important role in Greek COIN operations throughout the civil war period despite historians who believe that after 1947 the Americans took on the burden of COIN operations in Greece alone.(1)
The Second World War and the Civil War Years
The first British military contacts with Greece begun during the Second World War years when resistance against the German forces was one of Britain’s top priorities. Resistance activities became more intense in October 1942, when the newly settled British organisation SOE-Cairo decided to launch Operation Harling. Its objective was to blow up the Athens-Salonika railway and thus prevent the dispatch of Axis reinforcements to North Africa. Three British commando teams – nine officers and three non-commissioned officers – led by Colonel Edward C. W. ‘Eddie’ Myers, with Major Christopher M. Woodhouse, as second-in-command, parachuted into central Greece. The operation was to be accomplished by Colonel Myers, ELAS, EDES and other minor resistance groups already acting in Greece.(2) On the night of 25-26 November 1942, they blew up the Gorgopotamos viaduct. The next step was Myers’ stay in Greece to co-ordinate the activities of the various resistance movements. Keeping a general eye on political forces in Greece was also one of Myers’ assigned tasks. This British resistance and intelligence group became the British Military Mission in Greece.(3) The mission controlled the distribution of money, arms, and other supplies. Management of the British Military Mission was entrusted to the British SOE-Cairo. Although resistance activities continued with no other spectacular act of resistance organised by British and Greek forces the British Mission remained and expanded to prove British interest in Greek political and military affairs. The amount of supplies and assistance that was provided by the British to ELAS- most important and active resistance organisation- to fight the Germans was relatively limited. The reason for this was that the British did not intend to boost the communist forces but assist resistance to the Germans and keep Greece and south-east Mediterranean under British control.(4)
By 1945 there were numerous British and Allied military formations in Greece, and by early January 1945 British Liaison Unit (BLU) was also recognised as a BMM to Greece. It comprised of about 300 officers and 1,000 other ranks, at first under the command of Brigadier Firth and then Major-General Smallwood. The Mission was named by PM Churchill to offer ‘advice and assistance’ on the organisation, supply and training of the Greek National Army (GNA). The Mission comprised of Army, Air, Navy and Police divisions to serve all corps. British soldiers became influential counsellors and advisers to the National Army and this practice had a long lasting impact on the British Army.(5) By March officers and other ranks from the BMM (G)’s 1,121 personnel were appointed as NA trainers on the basis of ‘field experience’.(6)
Modern guerrilla war gathered momentum in the Greek mountains with ELAS and the National Army fighting over political issues by the summer of 1946 and as a result the British Military Mission was assigned major military offensives. The British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Clifford Norton, BMM Commander, General Rawlings, the CIGS designate, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, recommended on 24 June to co-ordinate forces and carry out operations to cope with the ‘bands’.(7) By 19 November 1946 General Rawlins and Spiliotopoulos, Greek Chief of the General Staff, were at the War Office in London to discuss military policy. On 28 November the British Chiefs of Staff agreed upon changes to the NA. Montgomery proposed greater use of air support, light infantry, and Commandos. The strategy proposed major intelligence-based, air-supported offensives and Commando units to develop the defeat of the Democratic Army defenders. The BMM (G) additionally sponsored a complementary ‘counter-organisation’ security plan, designed to destroy the DA’s ‘underground support infrastructure’.(8)
As the Americans put their main touches to their aid programme during 1947, they pressured the British to maintain a united front against the communist threat. On 2 September 1947 the top American official in Greece, Dwight Griswold, called the British to join the US Army officers in advising the GNA. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, sought to assist the BMM(G)’s preparations for a renewal of its operational advisory role by sending the Indian Army and other officers with guerrilla experience to the Mission. In autumn 1947 the BMM in Greece reviewed current Greek practises and suggested enforcement of commando patrolling by appointing expert advisers to the commandos units. Moreover, they also favoured intelligence services to obtain accurate information about the KKE. Indeed the British Cabinet agreed to allow some British soldiers to renew their activities in the following year and up until 1950, whereas the BMM (G) remained active in Greece until 1952 when Greece joined NATO. The British sought to improve practises in Greece, by appointing former SAS offices, who had led police undercover squads in Palestine.(9) In this line of enquiry British importance in operations in Greece is introduced and American monopoly refuted.
By mid January 1948, the commander of the Joint United States Military Advisory Planning Group (JUSMAPG) General W. S. Livesay along with the British War and Foreign Office jointly drew up a directive that appointed the BMM (G) to organising and train the GNA and JUSMAPG responsible for advising on logistics and operational planning. The American Group had already appointed forty-five men to assist the GNA, whereas an outnumbered and outranked strength of 183 British officers and 731 other ranks gave an at least three times more than the American counterparts.(10) British officers provided allied advice during the spring and summer of 1948.
Major-General Ernest E. Down replaced Rawlins as BMM(G) Commander by the end of March 1948 as a result of the new strategy of Clear and Hold to better counterbalance the communist forces and the failed policy of encirclement of last year. Hence Down implemented counter-guerrilla tactics along with continuous offensive operations coupled by a great number of infantrymen supported by the maximum use of airpower. Operation Dawn against the communist forces was a new attempt to defeat the Democratic Army on a political, military and intelligence level. It lasted for three weeks in April 1948 and performed counter-organisation mass arrests and huge encirclements.(11) The BMM (G) maintained Raiding Forces training throughout that year, and stressed the need for prolonged intelligence-based patrolling and raids performing in guerrilla areas in support of the Army.
In March 1949 Field Marshal William J Slim, the new CIGS, visited Greece and urged the GNA to Clear and Hold areas by using Commandos and air support.(12) He shared the view that by cutting the communication line of the DA defenders between its hubs, the NA would finally manage to isolate and weaken strategically, politically and militarily the Democratic Army. This policy was based on a joint operation mainly of the army, air and police forces. He gained ground within certain quarters of the British military establishment. The end of the civil war in October 1949 brought the victory of the national forces and credits to the British share. Apart from the obvious and well planned political benefits, Whitehall enjoyed military gains as well. Some historians have asserted that the allied strategy in Greece by 1949 had also been adopted in Malaya.(13) This proves the importance of the Greek COIN operations as case study for the British as well as British intervention in military and political developments in Greece. Although the Greek case did not lead to formulating a particular doctrine, yet two of the battalions that were based in Greece were sent out to Malaya to bolster British COIN operations there, where a communist insurgency emerged by summer 1948.(14) In this way British gained valuable lessons in COIN tactics in the Far East and the Greek experience put the foundations for a new British approach to counter-insurgence operations.
The British Army, a force of 5,000 men after autumn 1947, had few opportunities to make an impact on the COIN operations of the GNA before the DA conceded defeat in the civil war in October 1949. It had a symbolic role in defending and safeguarding the GNA against the imminent KKE challenge and probable Soviet threat. In terms of actual fighting, the British Army did not take an active part in actual warfare, however, the Army contributed to a great extent to the ultimate success of the NA by ensuring that it did not collapse in the face of the KKE fights. Hence both British intervention and new tactics, notably commandos and air support provided key advisory and operational support, bolstering and stabilising the NA. The last battalion that remained in Greece, after the British announcement to withdraw aid from Greece in February 1947, departed from Salonika after the end of the civil war in February 1950.(15) The reason was that negotiations had already started for Greece to join the northern alliance. In this light, the British Army has also its share in the outcome of the civil war in Greece, despite those who believe that it was only the Americans who saw the NA through to their eventual victory.(16)
Military operations throughout the civil war proved British thinking about COIN warfare in Greece successful in fulfilling British interests in the area. Commando performance was important in pursuing the DA. Clear and Hold strategy established a framework for military, political and intelligence co-operation that lay at the root of future success. The strategy necessitated the retraining and re-organisation of the security forces by British units, instruction team and intelligence offices. The British role was crucial in terms of air power. Air supplies and equipment, RAF personnel and RHAF training improved the later’s levels of performance. Air raids were of decisive importance against the DA defenders, who lacked any air cover.(17) So the whole period of the civil war was a continuing project by the British and Allies to keep Greece under western control.
The British Military Mission and the NATO Framework
Following the end of the civil war both the British Military Mission and the Joint United States Aid to Greece (JUSMAG) had decided to reduce their presence in Greece. The official task of both missions was to advise and assist the Greek General Staff in maintaining the national forces as an effective westernised army.(18) Both the British and the Americans engaged, however, in more direct aid. They continued to lead ‘intelligence gathering’ patrols in the border areas.
The post-civil war objectives of the British Military Missions in Greece had been set out on 13 June 1950. Their first task of ‘clearing the ground’ was all but accomplished with the end of the civil war. The emphasis shifted therefore to the second task – ‘building the house’ as it was called. This involved the creation of self-sufficient armed forces, which in future, would be able to operate without constant guidance from British and American military advisers. For the British this transformation was to come about as much through professionalisation as it was through re-equipment.(19) The British set up Basic Training Centres all over the country, Training Establishments in Staff College, Specialist Training Centres, Army Schools, Corps Schools. These centres functioned under joint British and Greek command. The training centres replaced the old method of training whereby conscripts were called up directly into units. The British also introduced a more formal system for officer selection and promotion to replace the haphazard ‘patronage’ system that had operated up until then. The aim was that from the 1950s onwards the majority of officers to be academy graduates.(20)
At the apex of the new system were two institutions. The War College prepared a small cadre of the most effective officers for future high military command. War College graduates were eligible to attend the National Defence School, which brought them together with civil servants and politicians. Here a future nexus for civil-military relations and national leadership was to be created. The products of these institutions came to dominate military affairs in the post-civil war period. British officers were involved in setting up this higher training system. The Americans were also influential at this level. Selective officers were also trained at training courses in the United States within the JUSMAPG context. Nevertheless it can be seen that British procedures and patterns of thought had been inculcated in the Greek military at all levels.(21) By the very nature of a hierarchical military establishment these influences, once implanted, would last for a generation.
British influence was far from negligible during the transitional period between the end of the civil war and Greece’s entry into NATO. Nevertheless, Greece’s inclusion into NATO resulted in the British decision to withdraw its Air, Army and Police missions.(22) D. F. Murray of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, explained in one of his reports to his superiors that if Greece joined NATO under Admiral Carney’s command, ‘there would seem to be little purpose in retaining dwindling British Missions’ in Greece.(23) According to the Air Commander, British Military Mission to Greece, the RAF Mission ‘will be negligible and barely worth considering’. He concluded that the mission should be run down and its duties handed over to the Americans.(24) The Americans themselves were happy with this arrangement. The Chief of the JUSMAG to Greece Major General Frederick (who had succeeded Jenkins in May 1951) believed that the British Military Mission in Greece had outlived its usefulness and should be dissolved by mutual agreement. The American Ambassador in Greece, Peurifoy, saw no advantages in retaining the British Military Mission. He noted that the British should ‘withdraw voluntarily at the time of final adjustment of command relationship in Eastern Mediterranean’. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the withdrawal of the British military mission would have no adverse impact on the efficiency of the Greek armed forces. They noted that those functions not taken over by the Americans would be filled by a small number British liaison-advisor officers left behind.(25) In early January 1952, thirteen British police officers, for instance, would remain at Gendarmerie training schools.(26) The strength of the RAF Mission was reduced to 3 junior officers: one Air Attach and two assistants, one of whom would be concerned solely with questions of supply for the Greek Air Force and detached permanently to work with the American Mission. The other would be appointed to the British embassy in Athens.(27) Army officers would remain affiliated to JUSMAG(G) that remained in Greece under Major General Charles Hart. The executive responsibility for the remaining British officers would also be transferred to the Chief of JUSMAG.(28) On 29 February 1952, General Perowne announced formally that the missions would cease to exist on 30 April 1952 ‘having accomplished’ their duties and being replaced by NATO’s services.(29)
The British Naval Mission, however, proved an exception. Britain intended to remain a significant naval power in the Mediterranean. ‘Showing the flag’ in the Mediterranean was the symbol of British naval power. In the purely Greek context they took a close and continuing interest in naval communications between Cyprus and the Greek mainland.(30) The British Naval Mission was to continue to ‘assist in the defence of the Middle East and fight alongside the British Mediterranean Fleet’ despite the presence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Aegean and the Mediterranean basin.(31) The British Naval Mission only came to end on 15 October 1955, when it was decided that its head Admiral Selby would not be replaced. According to the official statement the reason for the withdrawal of the Mission was financial.(32) Admiral Selby himself noted, however, that other considerations lay behind the decision to ‘wind up’ the mission and turn its functions to a lower ranking British Naval Attach. By 1955 the Greek government was no longer subordinating the question of Cyprus to the need to integrate in the western alliance. Instead they were consciously whipping up anti-British feeling over Cyprus. In addition a new American Commander in the Mediterranean, Admiral Fechteler ‘did not want us [the British]’.(33) According to the agreement between the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Greek authorities the Mission would remain on a ‘dormant basis’ to ‘keep an eye’ on the Mediterranean area and provide Britain with a naval listening post.(34)
British intervention in Greece during the Second World War, the Civil War and the first post-Civil War years has been imminent and influential in many ways. This was the result of British intention to fight the enemy, which had the form of the Axis power during the Second War Years and communism during the Civil War years. The military role of Britain in developments in Greece has been important and influential on a part with its political intervention. The aim of the British Military Mission was to practice intelligence activities in the area and influence military undertakings. The role of the British Army was to support the Greek National Army to build a new post-war state. Their practices, complicated by the Civil War, evolved around different strategies and tactics to bit the Democratic Army and strengthen Greece’s territorial security. British rational is justified by timing that key decisions were taken: 1942 brought the BMM in Greece, 1944 the British Army, 1949 the withdrawal of the Army and 1952 the withdrawal of the BMM. A multi-dimensional type of warfare, which combined political, intelligence and military activities, was used for the first time by combining British, American and Greek government defenders. In this sense, counter-insurgency campaigns in Greece became a model for later operations and this gives extra credit to the case of Greece. The importance of British role in Greek COIN operations also deconstructs the political and military American monopoly and gives a balanced re-assessment of the actors that influenced international and domestic developments.
1 L. Wittner, US Intervention in Greece, 1943-49 (NY, 1982), pp. 232-36; J. O. Iatrides, ‘Britain, the US and Greece, 1945-49’ in D. H. Close (ed) The Greek Civil War, 1943-50, London, 1993, p. 203, 207.
2 For early resistance activities between the British and EAM see, E. W. Myers, Greek Entanglement (London, 1955); C. M. Woodhouse, ‘Early British Contacts with the Greek Resistance in 1942’, Balkan Studies 12, no. 2, (1971), 347-354; R. Clogg, ‘Pearls from Swine’: the Foreign Office Papers, SOE and the Greek Resistance’, in Ph. Auty and R. Clogg (eds), British Policy, pp. 167-208. C. Woodhouse, ‘The National Liberation Front and the British Connection’, in J. Iatrides (ed), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 81-101.
3 E. W. C. Myers, Greek Entanglement (London, 1955), pp. 13-96; C. M. Woodhouse, ‘Early British Contacts with the Greek Resistance in 1942’, Balkan Studies 12, no.2 (1971), 347-354.
4 O’Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 56-57. E. Barker argues that British policy towards the various resistance movements in Greece ‘seemed a matter of conflict’ provoking civil war, in Barker, British Policy, p. 148; Sfikas also emphasises the negative effect of British assistance towards ELAS, for simultaneously challenging the Greek established order. Th. Sfikas, The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War [in Greek], (Athens, 1996), p. 47. On this line, Vlavianos notes that the British assistance to ELAS has its share in the civil war that followed in that it cabled ‘contradictory’ orders after 1943. Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 30. Sarafis refutes enormous British assistance to the KKE. Sarafis, ELAS, p. 278. From another point of view, the KKE was inclined to claim for power despite British intervention. O’Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 75-76, 85-86; C. Shrader, The Withered Vine (London, 1999), p. 52; C. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece (London, 1976), pp. 27, 36, 64. In this sense both Sarafis and Woodhouse proved right
5 PRO, WO 170/4069, 7570, Allied Forces-AFHQ-notes, January 1945; FO 371/48245 R 4931, PM to Foreign Secretary, 7 January 1945.
6 PRO, WO 204/8748, LFGHQ note on BMM (G) and their role, 26 March 1945.
7 PRO, FO 371/ 66997, R1131, Rawlins notes, 11 July 1946.
8 PRO, WO 202/893, Plan Joint Memo, 27 December 1946.
9 PRO, WO 202/893, Review of the Anti-Bandit Campaign, 22 October 1947.
10 PRO, FO 371/72239, COS (48)20, 10 February 1948.
11 PRO, AIR 46/30, BMM (G) role, 24 March 1948.
12 A. Campbell, Guerrilla (London, 1967), p. 305.
15 Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section I, Reel II, Frame 0267, 1801/27, Memo by the COS, US Army for JCS, 16 November 1949.
16 This is one of the pillars of the orthodox and revisionist schools of thought.
17 PRO, DEFE 5/8, COS (48) 129, 22 October 1948; GES/DIS [Greek General Staff History Archives], 1012/Á/6, Report by Lieutenant General George Papageorgiou [in Greek], 27 October 1948.
18 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/904, Report by Brigadier G. D Browne, BMM in Athens, November 1950-June 1951. Within this context, the JCS decided to provide additional military aid to Greece. In fact, as a result of the Korean War and the American policy of containing the communists, the ceiling strength for the Greek military establishment was set to 94,700 to be attained by 31 December 1950; with the distribution of personnel: 80,000 Army, 8,500 Navy, 6,200 Air Force. On 15 September 1950, the JCS approved a further ceiling increase for the Greek armed force of 164,400: 147,000 for the Army, 10,000 Navy, 7,400 for the Greek Air Force. Similarly, on 15 February 1951 the NSC approved that the United States should undertake to maintain internal security in Greece, repelling any attempt of communist attack and finally bear an increasing percentage of the Greek economic burden. Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, US Military Assistance, JCS 1798/58, 29 September 1951, Reel IV, Frame 0038.
19 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 32/15547, Report on The Work of the BMM (Greece), by Major General C. D. Packard, 13 June 1950; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908, A History of the BMM 1945-1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 R1192/23, A History of the BMM(G) 1945-1952.
20 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 32/15547, History of the BMM(G) 1945-1952, 13 June 1950; Greek Army Headquarters, History of the Organisation of the Greek Army [in Greek] (Athens, Dept. of Army History Publication, 1957) cited from Kourvetaris, ‘The Greek Army Officer Corps Its Professionalism and Political Interventionism’, in Janowitz, Van Doorn (eds.), On Military Intervention, pp. 170-190.
21 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/ 895, Major General E.E. Down report, June 1947-November 1949; WO 32/15547, History of the BMM 1945-1952. Table of the Army General Staff, 3rd Office of Education of the Officers, Athens, cited in Kourvetaris, ‘The Greek Army Officer Corps’, in Janowitz, Van Doorn (eds.), On Military Intervention, p.171. The training of the local national armies with the aim to make them capable of defending their nation was a typical task undertaken by both the BMM and JUSMAG. Training centres and training officers operated in particular areas of interests world wide as well as one of the most critical aspects of foreign involvement in a country. An American mission operated in Vietnam from the beginning of 1954 to support United States involvement in Southeast Asia. See: J. L. Collins (ed.), The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army 1950-1972 (Washington, 1986).
22 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95157 R1641, minute by Murray, 8 November 1951, 21 December 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914, Report on ‘Future of British Service Missions in Greece’, 21 November 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 216/473, Notes from General Perowne, 25 March 1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 216/473, W.S. Slim report, 18 April 1952.
23 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 R1192/15, D.F Murray, 15 August 1951.
24 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 R1192/15, memorandum by R. Barnes, 23 August 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), AIR 20/8439, D. G Lewis- Commanding RAF Mission in Greece, 7 September 1951.
25 Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, US Military Assistance, JCS 1798/59, 23 August 1951, Reel IV, Frame 0038; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/96551 WU11923/272, Ottawa Meeting, 17 September 1951.
26 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101830 WG 1643/1, Report by J. C. A Roper, British Embassy to Athens, 5 January 1952.
27 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 WG1192/2, D. F. Murray, 10 January 1952.
28 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/906, Major General Commander LECM Perowne, 29 February 1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 216/473, S. Venizelos to General Perowne, 26 April 1952. Churchill College Archives, Cambridge, Noel Baker Papers, 4/350, 12 May 1952, press cutting without title.
29 Brigadier G. P. Hobbs is a typical intelligence officer, who worked in Greece as Chief Staff Officer, BMM(G) 1942-1947, Colonel of Liaison 1947-1949, Military Attach in Athens 1954-1957. Major General H. L. Boatner, JUSMAG (G) on 18 January 1955 noted Hobbs as ‘leading figure’ in the British Espionage Service with the aim to maintain Greece under the British influence. King’s College London Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Brig. G. P. Hobbs Papers, 16/1-13 NID.
30 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/23715, Report of Head of British Naval Mission, 1-5/1952; FO 371/95141 R1192/15, memorandum by D. F Murray, 28 August 1951.
31 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 R1192/15, minute by Cheetman-Foreign Office, 20 September 1951; FO 371/95141 R1192/21, minute by Morrison, 22 November 1951. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/23538, M0193/52, 22 January 1952; FO 371/95141 R1192/15, meeting in Foreign Office on Service Missions, 28 August 1952; ADM 116/6330, 24 October 1955. National Library of Scotland, Rear Admiral Robert Kirk Dickson Papers, Head of the BNM in Athens 1949-1951, MS 13587 (207-214), 30 September 1949, 13 October 1951. Accordingly, it was claimed that the Greek Navy had 90 British vessels, including 6 submarines, but only 42 American vessels and a high proportion of the largest ships were British. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 R1192/15, Cheetman-Foreign Office to Parker H.-Ministry of Defence, 20 September 1951. There is also the reason that the British withdrew their Air, Army and Police Missions for economic reasons while they kept their Naval Mission in Greece with the aim of linking the Greek and Turkish naval forces to MEC through a British Allied Naval Commander for the Mediterranean. In Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 101. This latter version, however, does not explain the timing the Mission withdrew in October 1955 when both Greece and Turkey were already under NATO’s command. Moreover the missions were not so numerous to be an unbearable cost.
32 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/23538, M0193/52, Report of Head of BNM(G) Rear Admiral Smith (1951-1953), 22 January 1952; The Times, 15 October 1955; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914, Ward-Head of Southern Department 1955- to H. Caccia-Private Secretary, 24 October 1955; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 116/6330, M370/18/55, Report on Future of BNM (G), 25 October 1955.
33 King’s College London Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Rear Admiral Selby Papers, GB 99 KCLMA Selby. Rear Admiral Selby was Head of BNM(G) 1953-1955. Of all the alternatives the most convincing seem to be the strengthening of the presence of NATO and Americas’ predominance.
34 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 116/6330, Rear Admiral W. H. Selby, 18 October 1955, 24 October 1955, 30 December 1955; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914, 24 October 1955.