Contents
ANISTORITON: History News
Volume 7, September 2003, Section H033
http://www.anistor.co.hol.gr/index.htm



The GDR (East Communist Germany) on its way to German Unity

How the GDR Communist Party and East German Historians have manipulated German History
between 1945 and 1989



by
Jan Herman Brinks
Ph.D, The University of Groningen, the Netherlands

One thing which most historians' agree about is that 1945 represented one of the fundamental turning points in German history. The events of that summer in Hiroshima and Potsdam, as Werner Conze states, represent crucial turning points in European and above all German history.

Whilst standard works and specialist analyses approach the argument with different emphasis they do agree on one issue. The Second World War started by Nazi Germany and the Cold War which followed it led to the division of Germany both territorially and in economic and social terms. Where Bismarck's Second Reich had once filled central Europe there emerged two completely opposing social systems. In the West a pluralist, democratic order developed under the influence of the USA, France and Great Britain. In a smaller eastern half consisting of Mecklenburg, Prussia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia a communist system was established under the Soviet Union's hegemony which bore all its hallmarks.

One of the interesting aspects of this process is that the division of Germany has caused considerable difficulties for the Germans with respect to their common past. In the eastern part Germany's history was manipulated in the truest sense of the word for the political purposes of the newly emerged system. Here, historiography developed internally into a "Herrschaftsideologie" (ideology of the ruling class) and at the same time as a "Kampfideologie" (ideology for struggle) for external purposes. This occurred the more the Soviet zone developed its own identity and moved towards the formation of the GDR (German Democratic Republic or East Germany). 1945 represented a historic chance to move towards a bright new Marxist-Leninist future under the Soviet Union.

In West Germany, historians saw 1945 as the final act of a 'German catastrophe'. Friedrich Meinecke called for a revision of the understanding of history, but at the same time pointed out the limits to this since there was no need for a 'radical revision', what had to disappear most of all was the Nazi Grossenwahn (lunatic madness). Up until 1968 this interpretation more or less set the tone for historiography in the Federal Republic.

The formation and development of West German historiography is sometimes characterized by the theory of the loss of history, based on the terrible excesses of the Nazi terror which increasingly became known after the war and on the difficulty of dealing with these crimes. Such was the extent of this that amongst historians in the GDR a view developed that their West German counterparts were promoting a 'national nihilism bound up with anti-socialist and anti-democratic tendencies.

Such views are difficult to sustain. Certainly, it is true that some West German authors showed little interest in German history or even considered difficult problems to be taboo. The reason for this lies in their belief that Germany's history was just a prelude to the Third Reich. Amongst the allies, too, there was strong distrust about teaching history in German schools. In the French zone, for example, this partly led to a ban on history in 1945. Apart from anything else the Nazi's ideological manipulation of history helps explain this background. For this reason it is untenable to talk about national nihilism in West Germany since historiography developed quickly and did not exclude difficult issues at all.

Nevertheless there were many problems to deal with. Up until the 1970s history was a subject which featured scarcely , and in some cases not at all, on school timetables in some areas of the Federal Republic.

A further problem concerns the relationship towards the division of the nation within the two German states. Although this was becoming more obvious, it initially received little attention. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which emerged after the unification of the Western zones of occupation regarded itself in the words of Theodor Heuss as a provisional, and then later , as a transitional state. A crisis of national identity grew out of the complicated events surrounding the division of the nation, which at the same time was burdened with the responsibility for the Second World War , a crisis which was reflected in the relationship of many West Germans to their own past, but especially so in the Federal Republic's historiography.

In his essay from 1978 Erich Kosthorst outlined the key features of these events. Insufficient thought has been given, he wrote, 'to what happens to a nation's youth, when ... Germany's entire history since Bismarck appears largely in a negative light, is seen purely as a prologue to Hitler's seizure of power and when the National Socialist regime is portrayed as the social price to be paid for the failed revolution of 1918/19'.

Werner Conze took this a stage further. He made the public and especially historians aware that the revision of Germany's historical image which occurred under the psychological pressure of the allies' reproach and their own scruples 'was at times full of self torment and at other times only superficially complete.' Moreover, 'the historic superiority of the western powers and ideas as well as the German trauma, both taken together, contributed to a situation whereby, in stark contrast to the other part of Germany , historians had little to counter the threat of a loss of national identity.'

Reference must be made at this stage to A. and M. Mitschetlich's excellent Die Unfdhighkeit zu trauern (The inability to mourn) from 1967 whose analysis, in my opinion, has proved itself relevant up to the 1980s. They write that this crisis of identity caused rivalry with the German Democratic Republic to become deeply ingrained. The Mitscherlichs go on to maintain that the 'fundamental disgust which applied to us for having obeyed authority, was pushed on to official representatives of that state. Ignorant of the role they played in the fantasy lives of both states, the Chairman (of the GDR) and the Chancellor (of the FRG) supplied a real power struggle for the legacy of Adolf Hitler, the most recent and last German ideal... History does not repeat itself, yet there is an urge within it to repeat itself. It can only be broken when historic events cause a major change of consciousness. This is meant to mean that it is possible To have a better and more appropriate understanding of what have hitherto been uncontrollable effects. Such a change of consciousness would have occurred had their been a period of mourning after the war-perhaps after some delay , with it based on an admission of guilt. Without working through the process of guilt however delayed it might have been, there could be no process of mourning.'

Erich Kosthorst described the problem in a similar way. He wrote that individuals and peoples are only viable living entities if they succeed 'through the process of mourning in linking up to a continuous tradition in their own history to find new values. But we have not managed to do even this--on the one hand because additional barriers were placed in the way of a partial restoration of state identity following its loss at the hands of National Socialism; on the other hand because political teaching often presented a totally negative picture of the continuity in German history by simplifying contemporary issues and by offering half truths as absolutely proven. In this manner, National Socialism was considered the inevitable conclusion to a thousand-year downward spiral with the Federal Republic seen as its final tribune.'

In his analysis of the developments in both countries Hermann Weber summarized the basic elements which with 'typical German thoroughness elevated Stalinism in the East and anti-communism in the West to unofficial state doctrines.'

One of the spin-offs of this undoubtedly was the lack of interest in the FRG concerning GDR historiography and this persisted for a Iong time, up in to the 1980s. According to Alexander Fischer, West German historiography hardly felt it necessary to respond to the multi-faceted challenges from the East. In 1980 he asserted, 'that academic interest in the historiography of the GDR only really began because the number of historians in the West who were dealing with the two German states was still estimated to be relatively modest.'

Even Gunther Heydemann had long observed that historiography in West Germany had to acknowledge the accusation that for many years it had only dealt with Marxist-Leninist historiography in a rather sporadic and inadequate manner. In addition, he listed the reasons for this lack of interest.

There were exceptions, of course, but after the breakdown of links between both sets of historians at the 24th Historians' Conference (25-27 September 1958 in Trier) and at the International Congress of Historians (Stockholm, 1960) relations were chiefly restricted to those between individual historians, and these were mostly on a private level.

How East German historians saw this problem can be deduced from the interview I held in 1987 with Professor Gunter Vogler from Berlin's Humboldt University. He stated in a similar vein that, 'the relationship between historians in the two Germanys was restricted for a long time to individual contacts on the one hand and mutual critical appreciation on the other hand, but this did not lead to a thorough, focused, professional exchange of opinions. The root of this situation was most certainly the given political circumstances and ideological differences of opinion. To my knowledge, a change was only introduced in the 1970s. The participation of historians from the GDR at the conference in Memmingen (FRG) in March 1975 to mark the 450th anniversary of the Peasant Revolts, entitled 'Revolutions in Europe' was a significant example of this, as was the attendance of West German colleagues at a conference devoted to the same theme held in Leipzig. Similar meetings followed then in the USA, Britain and elsewhere.'

The substance of what Vogler has alluded to, leads us to the political and historiographical developments within the GDR, which form the basis of this work and which I shall now outline. The first thing to note is that since its foundation the GDR found itself searching for a national identity, based on the construction of socialism on German soil. The political starting point for this was both the ambition to achieve German unification on the basis of socialism as well as a clear demarcation from the FRG, goals which at times were both pursued simultaneously.

Working out its vision of German history within this framework was the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the ruling Marxist-Leninist party, which had emerged from the forced merger of the KPD and SPD in 1946. (Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1966, 1:4) Undoubtedly pressure from the Soviet Union played a role here. The basis for it was, however, the SED's (East German ruling communist party) own reception of historical materialism, which itself was rooted in a vision of German history based on the classic leaders of Marxist-Leninism (Marx, Engels, Lenin) as well as the key thinkers of revolutionary social democracy (Franz Mehring, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and August Bebel). The concepts and ideas of these men and women concerning a future Germany especially as they appeared in the works after 1871 endorse exactly the sort of the struggle for unification and demarcation as desired by the SED, even if this image alternated between the vision of a unified Germany based on class and one based on the nation state.

Stemming from these factors, the result, for good or bad, had to be a partial 'loss of history 'which the SED leadership and GDR historians then went on to dwell over permanently and unmistakably. This is clearly demonstrated in how the GDR saw itself, even if the GDR perceived itself as continuing the revolutionary tradition of German history. These traditions were understood as being 'part of the historical legacy of those revolutionary ideas, deeds, movements and struggles with which the working classes, led by the Marxist-Leninist party, identifies itself, and which continues and develops such ideas further.' (Kleines politisches WJJrterbuch 1986, 825)

History, that is to say German history, was, as the GDR saw it, divided according to a 'two-line theory' a reactionary line and a progressive class line. The latter was to be incorporated in the struggles of the masses for progress, but most clearly of all in the ideals, organizations and political struggles of the German revolutionary workers' movement and its leadership. The historical image within the GDR as result of these social processes sign posted the way to the creation of socialism on German soil, in other words to the GDR via a route of sacrifices, victories and defeats. To a certain extent giving this line a latent objective, the GDR viewed itself, as the (natural result of and epitome of the masses' century-long struggle for social progress. Above all it embodies the selfless struggle of the working class, led by its revolutionary party, against capitalist oppression and exploitation, against imperialism, militarism and war and in favor of democracy , peace, social progress and the triumph of socialism and communism.'

According to this image of history the following progressive traditions were at work in German history:

a) the first early bourgeois revolution in Germany, namely the Reformation and the Great German Peasants' War of 1525;

b) events in and around Prussia, in particular the wars of liberation 1813/14;

c) the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1848;

d) the Great Socialist October Revolution of 1917 in Russia;

e) the German November Revolution of 1918; also one of the high points of the international workers' movement;

f) the anti-fascist resistance in the Second World War;

g) the successes of the immediate post war years in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany and then the construction of the GDR.

There may well be some specific academic arguments behind this listing of events and their enumeration as traditions, but on the whole the chief significance was, as Bartel and Schmidt stated in 1981 , due to the GDR's need for a political identity: 'There was an eminently practical side to the concept of tradition. It had to be applicable for political practice.'

Over the years the nature and extent of this understanding of tradition underwent many changes, as indeed did the image of history in GDR historiography as a whole. An important, if not the most significant change occurred at the start of the 1970s. Following the dissemination of the theory of the GDR as a developed socialist society, an official policy pursued since the SED's 8th Party Congress in 1971, a more differentiated evaluation of German history began. The Fifth Conference of GDR historians, which took place in Dresden in 1972, increased discussion about this considerably .What spurred the discussion was a speech entitled 'Issues about the SED's cultural policy' with official attitudes to the need for history , held at the sixth meeting of the SED' Central Committee by Kurt Hager, the SED leader responsible for matters of science and culture.

The framework for this discussion and the freedom of thought could not be overwhelming-the SED leadership determined the link between politics and history , which it had proclaimed for years previously like a gospel. Increasing political demands of the country' s historians to help in the formation of a developed socialist society now counted as the source of a new historical perspective. But in spite of these ideological cliches this discussion did widen the understanding of history and tradition.

The organized exchange of ideas in the media and at numerous conferences about the reception of history and the development of tradition in the GDR involving SED functionaries, historians, philosophers, economists and sociologists was a high point of this process in the mid 1970s. This made a major contribution to a new view of national history and in particular Prussian German history , which was clearly evident in the positive inclusion of Frederick II and Bismarck into the GDR's historical image. Included in this were differentiated assessments of Luther, with an eye to the forthcoming Luther anniversary in 1983. This forceful rebirth of Prussia was not just a coincidence nor was it purely the result of historiographical insights. Rather, at least two political motives were at play: on the one hand there was the continuing search for the GDR's own identity, which seemingly did not appear to have enough substance on its existing basis, and on the other hand, closely connected to the first was the desire to demarcate the GDR from the odium of the FRG, where, incidentally interest in Prussia was increasing at about the same time. In the SED's eyes, this, no doubt, made the demarcation even more urgent. Prussian history, from the GDR's point of view, played a special role in the creation of a national identity , because a large part of the former Prussian State was situated in the GDR's territory.

The positive inclusion of Bismarckin to the GDR's image of history was, in the same way as with Luther , a course best described as a zigzag, a translation of political ideas into historical concepts.

An example can explain this in more detail. Up until 1968 the GDR leadership had programmatically fixed and practically moved towards the unification of Germany under socialism and in constant clashes with the FRG, for example with official government proposals and diplomatic notes. Once the Grand Coalition took over in Bonn in 1966, the GDR sought to distance itself even more strongly by emphasizing sharply the idea of two separate states. If this was not at the behest of the Soviet Union then it was undoubtedly with Brezhnev's agreement. Papers from the SED's 7th party congress in 1967 indicate that there were internal disagreements about this which went to the very top of the leadership. The outcome of this, however , was that the SED went over to ditching the idea of a unified nation in its fullest sense and this was complete by the start of the 1970s. At the 8th Party Congress in 1971, Honecker maintained that history had already decided about the issue of unification. Drawing on earlier conceptual efforts such as those of GDR philosophers from the 1960s, the SED articulated, at the same time the idea of the development of a 'new type of nation' in the form of the GDR, often termed a socialist or a class nation. The FRG, on the other hand, symbolized the continuing existence of a bourgeois German nation. This division went together with the development of a national concept whereby ethnic criteria were secondary and absolute priority was attached to social and economic conditions as constituent features of a nation.

After a period of silence the GDR leadership cautiously but clearly continued to keep the question of German unification open despite this demarcation. According to Erich Honecker in 1981 the unification question would necessarily be recast by the socialist transformation of the FRG. On the whole demarcation was essentially just ideology and hoping for a better future. In practice the GDR's policy was to keep open the border to the FRG to assist the urgently needed economic development of the GDR. In no way can this partial dependency on the FRG, the class enemy, accepted for better or worse, be described as demarcation.

This political dichotomy also revealed itself in the GDR's relationship to Germany's Prussian history, which was split into a progressive and a reactionary part in much the same way as the nation had been. Since the GDR considered itself to be the heir, guardian and future custodian of progressive ideas and actions, it pointed its finger to a certain extent at the FRG as if to say it had to be the legacy of the other part, 'the crap heap of German history', to put it bluntly.

The GDR tried even harder to claim Prussian German history for itself as it sought a national identity by the mid 1970s since it had to provide firm historic reasons for this self-proclaimed demarcation. This was intended to succeed in such a manner that the reactionary part and its related impact were now to be split into progressive and reactionary phases and thus adapted to the needs of identity and demarcation. The result was that Bismarck could be placed as a positive element in the GDR's image of history.

A similar approach occurred with the inclusion of Luther. According to the two-line theory the peasants' struggle in the war of 1525 together with Miintzer constituted a progressive factor in the traditions leading to the GDR. But Luther and the Reformation for many years did not belong to this despite new and differentiated evaluations. Luther was considered to be a heavily tainted figure because of the bourgeois class differences he brought about and because of his stand in the Peasants' War against the peasants. Under the period of Soviet occupation he was effectively excluded from the GDR's image of history and thereafter he was counted more as a reactionary rather than a progressive figure. Luther only came to be seen in a positive light at the start of the discussion about tradition and heritage at the start of the 1980s. Here, GDR historians went further in their reappraisal than with Bismarck and Prussia's history. The great Reformer was by and large, integrated in to the positive tradition even with his work after 1525. Put differently, he was presented quite positively and acclaimed widely in public, which must be understood in the context of the move towards the anniversary of Luther in 1983. This reassessment was a sacrilege twice over, since the positions of the classical Marxist writers with regard to theology in general and Luther in particular were no longer counted as sacred. Reference to the whole of German history, however, remained true to the traditional line of these writers. The whole renewal of the GDR's vision of history had come about from the search for national identity and the desire to achieve demarcation but did they actually have consequences in this respect? I believe they did have an effect in another direction; namely as one of the most decisive foundations for the German-German discussions facilitated by the figure of Luther, since the emphatically positive evaluation of theology, intended or not, enabled the Church to act as a bridge between the two German states. As such it more or less presupposed a further effect, namely the erosion of the two-line theory in German history and the demise of the concept of the class nation. Looking at the 1980s in retrospect, the undermining of the two- state policy of the GDR and the inter-German discussions aroused by Luther and Bismarck, seem to me to be important indicators within the GDR of a the path towards German unity. By the same token the reflection on Frederick II had a similar effect. The reemergence of the Prussian reformers signified, in my view, not so much an ideological renewal nor one in terms of content but rather it symbolized a relaxation of methodology. These differentiated assessments carried out in the framework of the totality of German history contributed to giving impetus to the forces towards German-German cohesion. And indeed this is how they developed.

The process I have had to outline rather briefly here received further impetus with Gorbachev coming to power in 1985. It can be assumed that due to the enormous ties between the Soviet Union and the GDR, a fixed relationship which was even more prominently articulated than in the Ulbricht era after Honecker took over in 1971, there was more movement not just in the GDR's version of history but also in the value attached to unification because of the causal link to the Soviet Union. At the moment we can only speculate whether demarcation, for years treated as a variable, and the question of unification, an invariable, were pressing issues between the GDR and the Soviet Union. What is clear is the reevaluation which did occur in the GDR's image of history.

The above essay is part of Jan Herman Brinks, Paradigms of Political Change. The GDR on its Way to German Unity. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001, were full bibliographic references can be found.

Subject: [H-GERMAN] CFP: East Germany Revisited
From:    Paul Steege 
Date:    Tue, 15 Apr 2003 18:36:30 -0400
To:      H-GERMAN@H-NET.MSU.EDU

From: H-German Editor Paul Steege 
Subject: CFP: East Germany Revisited
Date: 15 April 2003

[The Editor received the following call for papers, which may be of
interest to some H-German members.]

___________________

CALL FOR PAPERS
___________________


Berlin, October 3 - 5, 2003


East Germany Revisited
Second East German Studies Conference

Ueberhaupt ist vieles viel verschiedener
Zweite Konferenz zur DDR-Forschung


Guests include:

Lutz Rathenow, Writer
(Keynote Speech +++ Ansprache)
Kerstin Hensel, Writer
(Reading +++ Lesung)
Rainer Simon, Filmmaker
(Film Discussion +++ Filmdiskussion)
Marianne Birthler, Federal Commissioner for the Documents of the State
Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic
(Panel Discussion +++ Podiumsdiskussion)
Bettina Wegner, Singer-Songwriter
(Reception +++ Abschlussveranstaltung)


The Third Part of Faust
Der dritte Teil des Faust

Mit freiem Volk auf freiem Boden: The Utopia and the Legitimational
Discourse of the GDR + Back to the Future: The GDR's Traditions and
Heritage + The East German Economy: Concepts Definitions Facts +++ Mit
freiem Volk auf freiem Boden: Utopie und Legitimation der DDR + Und der
Zukunft zugewandt: Die Traditions- und Erbediskussionen der DDR + Plan
Markt Schatten: Die DDR-Wirtschaft in Theorie und Praxis


Specters of Power, Specters of Reality
Macht Realitaet Wahrnehmung

Wissen ist Macht: The Know-How of Domination + Was oeffentlich ist, ist
auch real: Investigations and Conceptualizations of the Public Sphere +
The Organization of Knowledge + Seeing and Being Seen: Politics as
Performance +++ Wissen ist Macht: Techniken der Beherrschung + Was
oeffentlich ist, ist auch real: Untersuchungen und Konzeptionen zu
Oeffentlichkeit(en) in der DDR + Sehen und Gesehen-Werden: Politik als
Performance


Transgressions
Uebertreten durchbrechen wenden

June 17, 1953: Research Perspectives Fifty Years After + Resignation
Resilience Resistance: The Politics of Eigensinn + At Home in the GDR:
Emigrants + House Home Hinterland: The Metaphorical Space of the GDR +
Crossbars and Crossings: The GDR Traveling +++ 50 Jahre danach:
Forschungsperspektiven zum 17. Juni 1953 + Zwischen Widerstand und
Anpassung: Die Politik des Eigensinns + Zu Hause in der DDR: Emigranten
+ Haus Heimat Hinterland: Der metaphorische Ort DDR + Beschraenkungen
Ueberschreitungen: Die DDR auf Reisen


Others
Vergleichsweise quasi so

They Have Every Right: The West and the Wall + Text Subtext Context: The
Historians' Debate Revisited + The Antifascist State and Its Fascism:
The Historiographies of the GDR+ East Germany and the Eastern Bloc +++
They have every right: Die Mauer vom Westen + Historikerstreit: Motive
und Motivationen + Der antifaschistische Staat und sein Faschismus: Die
Historiographien der DDR + Ostdeutschland und der Ostblock


The End of the GDR? (Dis)Continuities
Das Ende der DDR? (Dis)Kontinuitaeten

Ten Years Ende: The Legacy of DEFA + Nie wieder! Censorship,
Surveillance and Legitimating before and after 1989 + Demokratischer
Aufbruch? The Politics of Values and the Status of Democracy +
Narratives of Change, Change of Narrative? +++ Zehn Jahre Ende: Wirken
und Nachwirken der DEFA + Nie wieder! Zensur, Ueberwachung und
Legitimierung vor und nach 1989 + Demokratisch praktisch gut: Werte und
Realpolitik + Die narrative Struktur der Wende


Open Topic
Offenes Thema

The conference greatly benefits from the plurality of approaches and
subjects. We expressly invite submissions on other related topics + In
addition, the conference will afford writers the opportunity to read yet
unpublished texts. +++ Die Vielfalt der Themen und Herangehensweisen
bereichert die Diskussion. Daher beruecksichtigen wir auch gerne
Vorschlaege, die ueber die angefuehrten Themen hinausgreifen + Ausserdem
wird die Konferenz auch Autoren die Moeglichkeit geben, bisher
unveroeffentlichte Texte vorzustellen.


Please submit abstracts to:
Bitte senden Sie eine Zusammenfassung Ihres Referats an:

Evelyn Preuss, Yale University, evelyn.preuss@yale.edu,
Peggy Piesche, Universiteit Leiden, p.h.piesche@let.leidenuniv.nl, and
Bernd Faulenbach, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum, fiab.re@cityweb.de

Deadline+++Einsendeschluss
M A Y 1 5 , 2 0 0 3

In cooperation with:
Sonja Haeder, Institut fuer Allg. Paedagogik, Humboldt Universitaet zu
Berlin

Sponsored by:
Stiftung Aufarbeitung

For more information about the conference, please see
www.yale.edu/east_germany_revisited



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